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In the images offalling statues, we have witnessed the arrival of
a new era. For a hundred of years of war, culminating in the nuclear
age, military technology was designed and deployed to inflict casualties
on an ever-growing scale. In defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial
Japan, Allied forces destroyed entire cities, while enemy leaders who
started the conflict were safe until the final days. Military power was
used to end a regime by breaking a nation.
Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a
dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision
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weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence
against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war,
yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear
from the war than the innocent.-President George Bush'
"(I)f I were an American GI, I'd much prefer being held in a cell
in the Hague to one in Baghdad."-Richard Dicker, Human Rights
Watch, responding to a hypothetical question about the prospect of
Saddam Hussein referring allegations against U.S. soldiers to the
International Criminal Court
2
I. Introduction
In recent military conflicts, the United States has gone to
extraordinary lengths to seek to minimize unintended civilian deaths and
injuries in combat, commonly referred to as "collateral damage." The
U.S has shown its effort in many forms: it has withheld target approval
for the Secretary of Defense or President in cases involving potentially
high collateral damage, incorporated military legal advisors throughout
the operational and targeting planning stages, and used more precision
guided munitions as well as sophisticated computer programs that help
forecast potential collateral damage. Yet, international human rights
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often protest that enough is not
done and that the U.S. may be guilty of war crimes due to collateral
damage. NGOs have become a force to be reckoned with in the law of
war arena and have attempted to have their complaints heard in judicial
'Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln At Sea off the Coast
of San Diego, California (May 1, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/O5/iraq/20030501-15.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2005).
2 Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and the
Struggle for an ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-107
(Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000). During the 1998 Rome
Conference deliberations over the International Criminal Court, U.S.
Ambassador for War Crimes David Scheffer discussed a major U.S. concern:
"'What if,' Scheffer postulated, 'the American army finds itself deployed on the
territory of Iraq as part of a U.N. force. Now, Hussein and his nationals are not
subject to this treaty because he hasn't signed on. But what if suddenly he pulls
a fast one, accuses some of our men of war crimes, and, as head of the territory
in question, extends the Court permission to go after them on a one-time
basis?"' Id.
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forums. Now that the International Criminal Court (ICC) is operating, 3
the NGOs may seek to use it as a permanent forum to argue that the U.S.
is guilty of war crimes in cases of unintended collateral damage resulting
from U.S. military operations. The potentially combustible combination
of the ICC Prosecutor, NGOs, and collateral damage raises the question
of the possibility of a politicized prosecution in the ICC.
This article explores the prospect of a politicized prosecution in
the ICC directed against the U.S military or senior U.S. civilian
government officials. In the United States, those who oppose the Court
are uneasy with the prospect that an independent prosecutor may initiate
politically motivated criminal investigations into U.S. military
operations.4  Conversely, proponents of the Court assert that the ICC
contains sufficient safeguards to protect against this possibility.'
3 The ICC was established by the Rome Statute of the International Court.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute or RS], reprinted in WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 167 (2001).
4 Marc Grossman, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(May 6, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/p/9949.htn (last visited Feb. 23, 2005)
("The Rome Statute creates a prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power..
• . We believe that the ICC is built on a flawed foundation. These flaws leave it
open for exploitation and politically motivated prosecutions."); Pierre-Richard
Prosper, United States Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, Address at the
Peace Palace, The Hague, The Netherlands (Dec. 19, 2001), in John Washburn,
Assessments of the United States Position: The International Criminal Court
Arrives-The U.S. Position: Status and Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 873
(2002) ("As many of you know, the International Criminal Court has been a
point of concern for the United States ... We are steadfast in our concerns and
committed to our beliefs that the United States cannot be part of a process that
lacks the essential safeguards to avoid a politicization of the process."); Alfred
P. Rubin, The United States and the International Criminal Court: Possibilities
for Prosecutorial Abuse, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 154 (2001) ("As
proposed, the discretion given to the prosecutor is enormous. Thus, the potential
for abuse of that discretion is also enormous . . . ."); John R. Bolton, The Risks
and the Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America's
Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 186, 196 (2000) ("Today, however, precisely
contrary to the proper alignment, the ICC has almost no political accountability,
and carries an enormous risk of politicization.").
' Washburn, supra note 4, at 877 ("Supporters of the Court say that, taken
together, this array of safeguards gives almost 100% protection against political
abuse or harassment through the Court for the United States . . . ."); Leila Nadya
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Although the U.S. is not a party to the ICC, the power of the ICC
Prosecutor has become a pivotal issue because ICC state parties-and
even non-state parties-could ask the ICC to extend jurisdiction over
U.S. personnel in their territory.6
Part II of this article sets forth the Prosecutor's powers and
analyzes them. Part fl deals with the law surrounding collateral damage
and how it evolved into Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute (RS).
This provision prohibits indiscriminate attacks that cause "incidental loss
of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects" which is
"clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated." 7 As this Rome Statute provision is derived from
the proportionality principles of the Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, this article will thus delve into the history and
background of the AP I proportionality principles. In examining AP I,
this article will establish that while these principles are widely accepted
as creating a useful balancing test for military planners and commanders,
their status as a universal criminal law standard is much less certain.
Having reviewed the power of the ICC Prosecutor and the law
surrounding collateral damage, Part IV of the article turns to the rise of
international human rights NGOs in the law of war arena. In particular,
Part IV concentrates on the substantial influence of the NGO movement
Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 401 (2000) ("[N]umerous procedural safeguards
are built into the Statute to prevent the Prosecutor from abusing his or her
power.").
6 Although President Clinton signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000,
the Bush administration informed U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan that the
United States has no intent to become a state party to the ICC: "Accordingly,
the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on
December 31, 2000. The United States requests that its intention not to become
a party, as reflected in this letter, be reflected in the depositary's status lists
relating to this treaty." See Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security, to UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan (May 6, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
The issue of potential ICC jurisdiction over U.S. personnel remains, though, as
Article 12 of the Rome Statute authorizes ICC jurisdiction over non-state party
personnel if the alleged misconduct occurs on the territory of a state party or if a
non-state party requests that the ICC take jurisdiction over crimes committed
within their territory. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12.
'Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
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in creating both the Ottawa Convention, which prohibits land mine
usage, and the ICC, and analyzes the NGO stance on collateral damage.
Part V uses the U.S. military operations in Kosovo and Iraq as
case studies to examine the interaction of U.S. military practice, NGO
criticism of U.S. efforts, and how NGO claims were presented and
settled by prosecutors. The U.S. approach to preventing and minimizing
collateral damage in both operations is analyzed, as well as how, in both
case studies, NGOs sought prosecution of U.S. personnel for alleged war
crimes due to the collateral damage. In the Kosovo case, the allegations
were addressed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
Prosecutor, while in the Iraq case, allegations were filed in Belgium
pursuant to the country's universal jurisdiction law.
The case studies provide a means to review how collateral
damage allegations have been treated in the past and offer insight and
lessons for the ICC Prosecutor. Accordingly, Part VI analyzes the
implications of the case studies for the ICC Prosecutor. The article
concludes that an ICC Prosecutor should abide by the Rome Statute
guidelines and generally refrain from ICC investigations of military
operations based solely on allegations of collateral damage. Moreover,
the article recommends that the ICC Prosecutor promulgate prosecutorial
guidelines that explicitly announce this policy.
II. The ICC Prosecutor
On July 17, 1998, in Rome, Italy, the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court drafted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (Rome Statute).8 After 60 nations ratified the Rome Statute, the
ICC became operational on July 1, 2002.9 On April 21, 2003, the
Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, in a
unanimous vote, elected Luis Moreno-Ocampo of Argentina to be the
first Chief Prosecutor of the ICC.10 This section will address the
8 SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 167.
9 International Criminal Court: Historical Introduction, at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statue/status.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
10 International Criminal Court: Office of the Prosecutor, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/otp/otpbio.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). See also Leila Nadya
Sadat, Summer in Rome, Spring in the Hague, Winter in Washington? U.S.
Policy towards the International Criminal Court, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 557, 583
(2003). Professor Sadat points out:
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potential powers of the ICC Prosecutor through reviewing and analyzing
the provisions of the Rome Statute.
A. Text of the Rome Statute
In assessing the powers and limitations of the ICC Prosecutor,
one must first consider the text of the Rome Statute itself. The Rome
Statute sets forth the qualifications and procedure for selecting and
removing the Prosecutor, the process by which the Prosecutor can
independently initiate an investigation, several checks on the
Prosecutor's investigating power, and language that guides the
Prosecutor's discretion regarding certain categories of crimes.
To begin, the Rome Statute's text sets out clear qualifications
and a procedure for selecting an ICC Prosecutor. RS Article 42 creates
the Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) and requires that the Prosecutor be a
person of "high moral character, be highly competent in and have
extensive practical experience in the prosecution or trial of criminal
cases."'1 1 The Assembly of State Parties chooses the Prosecutor by "an
absolute majority" and the Prosecutor serves for a nine-year term. 12 The
Prosecutor "shall act independently and as a separate organ of the
Court." 1 3 RS Article 46 enables an "absolute majority of the States
Parties" to remove the Prosecutor for "serious misconduct or a serious
breach of his or her duties" or for an inability to "exercise the functions
required by this Statute. 1 4
The selection of the Court's Prosecutor was more difficult, as
States tried very hard to find a candidate that could be chosen
by consensus. Ultimately, a distinguished Argentinean lawyer
and law professor was chosen, Luis Moreno Ocampo. Sr.
Moreno Ocampo had established his reputation as a prosecutor
during several high profile trials involving leading figures
from Argentina's military junta. He is also a renowned
academic in the field of human rights, and is the Robert F.
Kennedy Visiting Professor at Harvard Law School. His
nomination was uncontested, and he was selected by
consensus at the ASP's third meeting, and installed in the
Hague on June 16, 2003.
Id. (citations omitted).
11 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 42.
12 Id. art. 42(4).
13 Id. art. 42(1).
14 Id. art. 46.
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Next, the Rome Statute text establishes a process by which the
Prosecutor can initiate an investigation. In performing an investigation,
RS Article 54(l)(a) requires the Prosecutor to "investigate incriminating
and exonerating circumstances equally." 5 RS Article 15(1) enables the
Prosecutor to "initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of
information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.' 16 RS Article
15(2) allows the Prosecutor to "analyze the seriousness of the
information received." 17 If more information is required, the Prosecutor
may "seek additional information" from States, U.N. organs,
international institutions, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 8
Although the Prosecutor is given the important power to initiate
investigations, there are several formal and informal checks on the
Prosecutor's power. The first major check on the Prosecutor's power is
the Pre-Trial Chamber review requirement. After assessing information
on crimes within the jurisdiction of the court, if the Prosecutor
determines there is a "reasonable basis" to "proceed with an
investigation," RS Article 15(3) requires the Prosecutor to first obtain
approval from the Pre-Trial Chamber.' 9 This means two out of three
judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber must concur that there is a "reasonable
basis" to investigate before the Prosecutor may proceed. 0
In addition to the Pre-Trial Chamber review requirement, the text
of the Rome Statute contains two other major formal checks on the
Prosecutor's authority to initiate an investigation. First, under RS Article
16 the United Nations Security Council can vote to defer a prosecution
'" Id. art. 54(1)(a).
16 Id. art. 15(1). See also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS,
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 212 (2001) (defining the Prosecutor's power
to initiate cases proprio motu as on his or her own initiative).
17 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 15(2).
18 Id.
19 Id. art. 15(3) ("If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a
request for authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting
material collected.").
20 Id. art. 39(2)(b)(iii) ("The functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be carried
out either by three judges of the Pre-Trial Division or by a single judge of that
division in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence."). See also id. art. 57(2)(a) ("Orders or rulings of the Pre-Trial
Chamber issued under articles 15, 18, 19, 54, paragraph 2, 61, paragraph 7, and
72 must be concurred in by a majority of its judges.").
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for twelve months at a time as long as the Council acts under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter.2' Second, perhaps a more commonly used check
will be the complementarity system under RS Articles 17 and 18. Under
Articles 17 and 1 8, the Prosecutor must defer to a State Party if the State
Party investigates or prosecutes the case the Prosecutor intended to
investigate, unless the State Party is "unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution. 22
Aside from these formal controls on the Prosecutor's discretion,
the Rome Statute text also provides guidance for the Prosecutor
regarding his or her choice of charging offenses. For example, the
Preamble recognizes the "unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the
conscience of humanity," "grave crimes" that "threaten the peace,
security and well-being of the world," and affirms that "the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished. 23 Accordingly, RS Article 1 states the ICC "shall have the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern." 24 Similarly, RS Article 5 limits the
Court's jurisdiction to "the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole. 25 RS Article 8(1) further provides
that "[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in
particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a
large scale commission of such crimes." 26 Under RS Article 53, the
Prosecutor must take "into account the gravity of the crime" and shall
consider if there are "substantial reasons that an investigation would not
,,27
serve the interests ofjustice. Similarly, under RS Article 17(1)(d), the
21 Id. art. 16.
2 2 Id. arts. 17-18.
23 Id. pmbl.
24 Id. art. 1.
25 Id. art. 5.
26 Id. art. 8(1).
27 Id. art. 53. Specifically, RS Article 53(1) provides:
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made
available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or
she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed
under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an
investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: (a) The
information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable
basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court has been or is being committed; (b) The case is or
would be admissible under article 17; and (c) Taking into
VOL. 13
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Court must find that a case is inadmissible if the case "is not of sufficient
gravity to justify further action by the Court. 28 Finally, RS Article 22
sets forth the rule of "strict construction" and provides that: "The
definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended
by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in
favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 29
Another potential source of constraints upon the Prosecutor
is the Assembly of State Parties. RS Article 112 governs the
Assembly of State Parties. It provides that each State Party can
send one representative, who each will have a single vote, to the
annual meeting of the Assembly. 3" Among its powers and
functions, the Assembly of State Parties approves the Court's
budget3" and provides "management oversight" of the Prosecutor.
3 2
In this capacity, the Assembly may create a "subsidiary body" such
as an "independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation
and investigation of the Court, in order to enhance its efficiency
and economy."33  While it is not clear at this stage how the
oversight mechanism functions will operate, one commentator has
suggested that the Assembly's fiscal powers could be used to
effectively deprive a Prosecutor the ability to investigate a
particular case or situation. 4 Moreover, both State Parties and
account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. If
the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to
proceed and his or her determination is based solely on
subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial
Chamber.
28 Id. art. 17(1)(d).
29 Id. art. 22(2). The rule "aims to ensure that criminal prohibitions are read to
the advantage of the person being investigated or prosecuted, in accordance only
with their clear meaning and with residual ambiguities resolved in favour of the
defense." BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE & THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 34 (2003).
30 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 112(6).
31 Id. art. 1 12(2)(e).
32 Id. art. 112(2)(b).
33 Id. art. 112(4).
34 LoUISE ARBOUR ET AL., THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE
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non-state parties will retain some indirect ability to influence the
Prosecutor because the Prosecutor must rely upon the states'
cooperation to conduct investigations.35
B. Analysis of the Rome Statute Provisions
The Rome Statute provisions concerning the Prosecutor and
related issues were forged together at the Rome Conference. Many of
the proposals generated intense debates as the parties sought to protect
their perceived interests. Consequently, key components of the Rome
Statute stemmed from negotiated compromises. Understanding the
issues raised at the Conference and the negotiating history helps place
the end result in perspective. Specifically, reviewing the origin of the
Prosecutor's independent investigatory powers and the various checks on
these powers provides some insight into the likely effect of the
provisions.
The debate over the Prosecutor's ability to independently pursue
an investigation was highly controversial. The argument over competing
positions created a "deep schism" between proponents of two separate
positions; an NGO influenced group of states favored an independent
prosecutor while several powerful states adamantly opposed an
independent prosecutor.36 The states who opposed the independent
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
(ICTY AND ICTR) 133 (2000). However, the same commentator also stated that
such a practice would contradict Article 42, which gives the Prosecutor the
ability to act "independently as a separate organ of the Court." An alternative
view is that "the Prosecutor should determine what proportion of its overall
resources should be allocated to each of the different matters the Office of the
Prosecutor is investigating and prosecuting." Id.
" Id. at 146. "But given the State cooperation regime of the ICC Statute, the
Prosecutor will in practice depend largely on the police and judiciary of States,
in particular territorial States where it is likely that many witnesses will be living
and where sites relevant to the alleged crimes are located." Id.
36 Sadat & Carden, supra note 5, at 400.
Defining the powers of the Prosecutor was a highly
contentious issue during the PrepCom I meetings, specifically
with respect to whether the Prosecutor should be able to act
proprio motu or ex officio, that is, on his or her own motion, in
bringing cases to the Court. This issue created a deep schism
among the PrepCom I delegates, with many smaller nations,
some European nations, and the NGOs strongly supporting a
Prosecutor able to act independently of State referral, and
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Prosecutor, including the United States, preferred the initial proposal that
allowed ICC prosecution only following a Security Council or state party
referral.37 This group generally feared the "politicization of the Court"
by a partisan or biased Prosecutor.3 8 Conversely, the advocates of an
independent Prosecutor, known as the "like minded group," believed that
the original proposal to allow prosecutions only after a State complaint
or a United Nations Security Council mandate would make the Court
ineffective.39 They cited the extremely limited use of State complaints in
other analogous settings4 ° and the many political considerations that
could frustrate obtaining unanimity among the Permanent Members of
the Security Council41 to support their view. Ultimately, the group
favoring an independent Prosecutor prevailed, in part due to the strong
many larger countries, including most of the permanent five
members of the Security Council, opposing an independent
Prosecutor.
Id. (citation omitted).
37 SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 97. "During the Rome Conference, the United
States declared that an independent prosecutor 'not only offers little in way of
advancing the mandate of the Court and principles of prosecutorial
independence and effectiveness, but also will make much more difficult the
Prosecutor's central task of thoroughly and fairly investigating the most
egregious of crimes."' Id.
38 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 408 (1998).
39 Id.
40 CHRISTOPH J.M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 84 (Oxford University Press 2001) ("[S]tate complaint procedures
in human right treaties have proved inefficient. Twelve states have made use of
the state complaint possibility of the ECHR, whereas no such procedure has
been invoked to date in the case of the ICCPR, the ACHR, or the AFCHPR.").
41 Id. at 81.
[T]he real power to prosecute would be left to the UN
Security Council. This organ is, to say the least, heavily
political and easily deadlocked. Establishing a prosecutor
who is highly dependent on this organ might possibly make
a mockery of the whole undertaking. The prosecutor would
never be able to initiate investigations against heads of
governments that occupy permanent seats at the UN
Security Council, because these states would simply protect
themselves or their 'allies' through the veto.
Id. (citations omitted).
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lobbying pressure of the NGOs.a2 However, in order to placate the group
opposed to the independent Prosecutor, a "system of checks and
balances" on the Prosecutor's authority was adopted as well.43
As discussed above, the major "checks" on the Prosecutor's
discretion include the Pre-Trial Chamber approval process, the
complementarity system, and the general textual limitations, such as RS
Article 8(1). What practical effect will these checks have on the
Prosecutor? The Rome Conference negotiations, and the subsequent
commentary and analysis, provide some clues; ultimately, though, only
42 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 22, 23 (1999). Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, the Senior
Legal Officer, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, served as the Secretary
of the Committee of the Whole of the Rome Conference.
Nongovernmental organizations played a significant role in
the negotiation process at the Preparatory Committee and the
conference. From the beginning, a large group of NGOs
committed themselves to the establishment of the ICC and
lobbied intensively. Their influence was felt on a variety of
issues, particularly the protection of children, sexual violence,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization and an independent
role for the prosecutor. Throughout the Preparatory
Committee's sessions and the Rome Conference, they
provided briefings and legal memoranda for sympathetic
delegations, approached delegations to discuss their points of
view, and even assigned legal interns to small delegations. On
occasion, they increased pressure on unsympathetic
delegations by listing them as such in the media.
Id. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 443,
455 (1999), where Professor Bassiouni writes:
The 238 NGOs at the conference also played a significant role
in discussing the issues and proposing options to government
delegations. The NGOs had contributed so greatly to the Ad
Hoc Committee and the PrepCom meetings that they were
given unprecedented access to meetings at Rome. Several
notable organizations actively lobbied for the tribunal and
provided legal and technical expertise.
43 Jimmy Gurul, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute
Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction
Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1, 11 (2002).
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time will tell how the Prosecutor's powers under the Rome Statute will
actually function in practice.
The Pre-Trial Chamber review process is a direct check on the
Prosecutor's ability to initiate an independent investigation. Under RS
Article 15(3), the Prosecutor must establish that a "reasonable basis"
exists before proceeding. 4 On the one hand, this can be viewed as a
45
significant control mechanism at a very early stage in the process.
Conversely, others point to the fact that the Prosecutor does not have to
receive approval from a unanimous Pre-Trial Chamber and that the
"reasonable basis test" is a "relatively low threshold. 46 It remains to be
seen how strong of a check the Pre-Trial Chamber review process will
be.
Similarly, the complementarity system has yet to be tested. The
system's supporters contend that complementarity represents "an
expression of concerns of State sovereignty" and is a significant
constraint on the Prosecutor.47 However, others are not so sure. As
former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, David
Scheffer, stated:
[C]omplementarity is not a complete answer, to the
extent that it involves compelling states (particularly
those not yet party to the treaty) to investigate the
legality of humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping
operations that they already regard as valid official
actions to enforce international law. Even if the United
States has conducted an investigation, again as a
nonparty to the treaty, the court could decide there was
no genuine investigation by a 2-to-i vote and then
launch its own investigation of U.S. citizens,
notwithstanding that the U.S. Government is not
obligated to cooperate with the ICC because the United
States has not ratified the treaty.48
44 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 15(3).
45 ARBOUR ET. AL., supra note 34, at 1 1 ("[O]ne must recognize, from a
comparative law point of view, that the Prosecutor is thus subjected to a very
early pre-trial control- earlier than is usual in national procedures.").
46 Guruld, supra note 43, at 20.
4 7 ARBOUR ET. AL., supra note 34, at 142-43.
48 David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93
AM. J. INT'L. L. 12, 19 (1999).
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Former Ambassador Scheffer's concern is based on RS Article 17(2)(c),
which allows the Prosecutor to proceed with a case, even after the State
has investigated the case, if the proceedings were not "being conducted
independently or impartially. '49 RS Article 17(2) provides minimal
statutory guidance for the Court to make this determination, though; the
Court need only consider the "principles of due process recognized by
international law." 50 As this gives the Court an undetermined amount of
discretion, the complementarity system's reliability and fairness become
questionable in practice.51
The general consensus surrounding the Rome Statute's textual
limitations on the Prosecutor's discretion is that they provide non-
compulsory guidance. Certainly, a theme throughout the Rome Statute is
that the ICC is for the most "heinous" offenses. 52 As discussed above,
this theme is woven through the preamble and some of the initial articles.
Following Moreno-Ocampo's election as the ICC Prosecutor, a policy
paper for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) recently emphasized this
"heinous offense" theme. The policy paper discussed the Prosecutor's
discretion:
Should the Office seek to bring charges against all
alleged perpetrators? The Statute gives some guidance
to answer this question. The Preamble reaffirms that
"the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished." It
49 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2)(c).
50 Id. art. 17(2).
5' Guruld, supra note 43, at 27-28.
Plainly speaking, if the Court disagrees with the outcome in
the State proceedings, it has the final say on the matter. The
Court may override the complementarity principle, and trump
the State proceedings if it concludes that they were not
conducted 'independently or impartially' because such
proceedings were inconsistent with 'principles of due process
recognized by international law.
Id.
52 SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 21 ("The crimes over which the International Court
has jurisdiction are 'international' not so much because international
cooperation is needed for their repression.. .but because their heinous nature
elevates them to a level where they are of 'concern' to the international
community.").
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continues that States Parties to the Statute are
determined to establish a "permanent International
Criminal Court in relationship to the United Nations
system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of
concern to the international criminal community as a
whole." Article 17, dealing with admissibility, adds to
the complementarity grounds one related to the gravity
of a case. It states that the Court (which includes the
Office of the Prosecutor) shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where "the case is not of sufficient gravity
to justify further action by the Court." The concept of
gravity should not be exclusively attached to the act that
constituted the crime but also to the degree of
participation in its commission. Furthermore, the Statute
gives to the Prosecutor the power not to investigate or
not to prosecute when such an investigation or
prosecution would not serve the interests of justice.
In addition to RS Article 17, RS Article 53 also invokes the
concept that a case requires a sufficient "gravity. ' 54 The emphasis on
gravity reflects that the "framers intended the ICC to be a forum for
trying major offenders, rather than pursuing perpetrators of isolated acts
falling under the Court's jurisdiction. 5  However, two expert legal
commentators who provided a paper to the Office of the Prosecutor as
part of the OTP "expert consultation process" were critical of RS Article
53, stating that it "begs more questions than it answers" and that RS
Article 53(1)(c) is primarily "characterized by its vagueness. 5 6 To
remedy this situation, they suggested the Prosecutor adopt criteria that
" OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, PAPER ON
SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 6-7 (Sept. 2003),
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy Paper.pdf (last
visited Feb. 23, 2005) (emphasis added).
54 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53.
55 RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 16, at 213.
56 AvRIL MCDONALD & ROELOF HAVEMAN, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION-
SOME THOUGHTS ON 'OBJECTIFYING' THE EXERCISE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION BY THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC 2 (Apr. 15, 2003), at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/mcdonaldhaveman.pdf (last visited
Feb. 23, 2005).
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will aid in evaluating whether RS Article 53 has been satisfied. 7
Nonetheless, until OTP promulgates such criteria or guidelines, one
cannot safely predict what cases will satisfy the gravity requirement.
Instead, international observers must await the Prosecutor and Court's
future practice to see if the requirement will develop into a meaningful
concept.
In defining the war crimes that may be prosecuted in the ICC,
the framers debated whether a definitional threshold should be placed on
war crimes. A "built in threshold" effectively restricts the Prosecutor's
discretion in the other two categories of crimes in the Rome Statute,
genocide and crimes against humanity. 58 The RS Article 6 definition of
genocide requires proof of intent to "destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical or religious group," and the RS Article 7 definition of
crimes against humanity requires proof of "a widespread or systematic
attack directed against a civilian population."5 9  Given the serious
magnitude of these crimes, they clearly fall within the ICC's overall
purpose, as reflected in the Preamble and RS Articles 1 and 5.
Moreover, there is less concern with a Prosecutor pursuing frivolous
investigations with these crimes, as it is inherently difficult to pursue
genocide or crimes against humanity without some compelling evidence
of horrendous acts.
In an attempt to treat war crimes in a similar manner, the U.S.
delegation proposed that war crimes be limited to those war crimes
perpetrated "as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes., 60 This would have ensured that only the
most serious war crimes were prosecuted in the ICC. This also reflected
a strong U.S. concern over a potential ICC prosecution involving
unintended collateral damage stemming from U.S. military operations.
61
" Id. at 3.
58 SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 24 ("Both genocide, by its very nature, and crimes
against humanity, by the widespread or systematic application, have a
quantitative dimension. They are not isolated crimes, and will in practice only
be prosecuted when planned or committed on a large scale.").
59 Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 6, 7.
60 Barton S. Brown, The Statute of the ICC: Past, Present, and Future, in THE
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 2, at 61,
69.
61 id.
The limitation originated with the U.S. government, which
was concerned that if civilians inadvertently were killed in the
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However, since a majority of delegates disapproved of any limitation on
the war crimes definition, the participating states approved a compromise
non-binding "in particular" threshold instead.6 2 Consequently, RS
Article 8(1) reads, "The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war
crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part
of a large-scale commission of such crimes. 63 Here, once again, the
Rome Statute provides the Prosecutor direction, but it does not compel a
specific result.64 Some view this as a useful "technique to limit the
jurisdiction of the Court; ' 65 but others have derided the statutory
language as the "so called threshold" or the "non-threshold threshold. 6 6
course of a U.S. peacekeeping mission abroad, U.S. troops
might be exposed to ICC jurisdiction. The original U.S.
proposal would have strictly limited the ICC's jurisdiction
over war crimes to those that were part of a policy or that were
committed on a large scale. As adopted in the form proposed
by the Bureau, the Statute makes these crimes the focus while
leaving the ICC with the flexibility to prosecute other war
crimes in appropriate cases. This illustrates the struggle of the
Conference, and of the Bureau, to balance the minimum
jurisdictional requirements of an effective ICC with U.S.
concern that such a court might investigate war crimes after
every U.S. military mission.
Id.
62 Guruld, supra note 43, at 30 n.153.
63 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(1).
64 Arsanjani, supra note 42, at 32-33. "The inclusion of the words 'in particular'
was intended to indicate the type of war crimes over which the court has
jurisdiction. The language as drafted, however, does not exclude jurisdiction
over a single war crime listed in the subsequent paragraphs of the article." Id. at
33.
65 SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 25. ("It should not be taken as any new restriction
on the customary definition of war crimes but rather as a technique to limit the
jurisdiction of the Court."). See also Roy S. Lee, Elements of Crimes and Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 110
(Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2001) ("This provision underlines that the Court
should exercise jurisdiction in particular in relation to systematic or large-scale
occurrences of war crimes, since these are primarily the situations that are of
concern to the international community. But, deliberately, the formulation does
not exclude that the Court may exercise jurisdiction in relation to isolated war
crimes."); Theodor Meron, Crimes under the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIANN BOS 52 (Herman A.M. von Hebel et al. eds.,
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Having reviewed the ICC Prosecutor's discretion, it becomes
clear that the Rome Statute provides the Prosecutor more in the way of
thematic guidance rather than absolute limitations. While the Statute
manifests its intent to plainly focus its jurisdiction on the "most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" in RS
Article 5 and elsewhere, it also contains a long litany of war crime
charges in RS Article 8.67 As the RS Article 8 "threshold" does not rule
out prosecution of war crimes that are not "committed as part of a plan or
policy or as part of a large-scale commission of war crimes,, 68 the
Prosecutor's discretion over war crimes poses a significant concern.
Former Ambassador Scheffer has stated that, "The central issue
confronting the United States government with respect to the ICC is the
risk that the Court may seek to investigate, obtain custody of, and
ultimately prosecute a U.S. service member or U.S. Government official
in connection with that individual's official duty.",69 How does the
Prosecutor's discretion measure up to such a test? Can the Prosecutor
pursue a criminal investigation based on U.S. military operations?
These questions are best analyzed through the prism of RS
Article 8(2)(b)(iv). This ICC war crime charge imposes criminal
responsibility for:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that
such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment
which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated.70
A political or overzealous ICC Prosecutor could use this provision to
launch a criminal investigation into U.S. military operations that result in
"collateral damage," that is the "incidental loss of life or injury to
1999). ("While it suggests a requirement of a threshold, the words 'in
particular' make it clear that that threshold is not absolute.").
66 Guruld, supra note 43, at 30-3 1.
67 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 3.
68 Id. art. 8.
69 David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course With the International Criminal Court,
35 CORNELL INT'LL. J. 47, 87 (2002).
70 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
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civilians or damage to civilian objects."'" Accordingly, an analysis of
the law supporting RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) will help elucidate whether a
Prosecutor would normally be justified in using this charge as a basis to
investigate routine U.S. military operations.
III. Collateral Damage
The term "collateral damage" cannot be found in either the
Hague or Geneva Conventions. Its origins date back to the 1970s. The
term emerged from the debate over a Pentagon proposal during the
Carter administration to develop the neutron bomb. A misperception
arose that the neutron bomb could kill humans but leave surrounding
buildings and landscape intact, thus avoiding "collateral damage."72
Collateral damage has since gained currency as a short hand phrase to
convey the notion of unintended "incidental loss of life or injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects. 73 The phrase implicitly invokes
two central concepts in the law of war: the principles of proportionality
and the principle of distinction. While these principles have strong
backgrounds in customary law,74 perhaps the most effective way to
71 Id.
72 Carl Cannon, Collateral Damage, The Question Nagging at the World's
Conscience is, What Cost Will Innocent Iraqis Bear? NAT'L J., Mar. 15, 2003.
73 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(b)(iv). The same language is also
found in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, infra note 75.
74 DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 9 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds.,
3d ed. 2000).
Perhaps the most fundamental customary principle is that the
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is
not unlimited. This notion, which clearly rests at the
foundation of the laws of war, was incorporated in the 1874
Brussels Declaration and the 1880 Oxford Manual, and was
formally codified in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations, in
Article 35(1) of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, and in the
preambles of both the 1980 Convention on certain
conventional weapons and the 1997 Ottawa Convention on
anti-personnel mines. Other fundamental customary
principles are proportionality and discrimination, derived from
the more basic principle that belligerent rights are not
unlimited.
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analyze them is through their codification in Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions (AP I).75
Additional Protocol I (AP I) of the Geneva Conventions
attempted to modernize the laws of war from the immediate post-World
War II era perspective of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.76 Part IV of
AP I, "The Civilian Population," contains a series of articles designed to
provide the civilian population greater protection by providing detailed
targeting rules for military personnel. 77 AP I Article 48, "The Basic
Rule," codifies the rule of distinction by providing, "In order to ensure
respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects,
the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives. 7 8 AP I Article 51 prohibits "indiscriminate
attacks., 79 In particular, AP I Article 51 (5)(b), a precursor to RS Article
8(2)(b)(iv), defines an indiscriminate attack as: "an attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated., 80 AP I Article 52(2) defines military objectives as: "those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage. 8 1 AP I Article 57 specifies precautions that
must be made before an attack and it requires an attack to be "cancelled
or suspended" if, among other things, the attack "may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
75 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), opened for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter AP I], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF WAR, supra note 74, at 422, 422-79.76 Id. at 419-20.
77 AP I, supra note 75, pt. IV. See also DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 74, at 419-20.
78 AP I, supra note 75, art. 48.79 Id. art. 5 1.
'o/d. art. 51(5)(b).
"1 Id. art. 52(2).
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relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. ' 2
(The criminal consequences of violating one of these articles will be
discussed further below.)
Just as collateral damage is not mentioned in AP I, neither is the
word "proportionality." However, applying the articles requires a
balancing test comparing the "incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof' against
the "concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." If the collateral
damage is "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated," then the attack is prohibited. Conversely, if the
"concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" outweighs the
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof," then the attack, with its
accompanying unintended collateral damage, is authorized. Thus, the
proportionality principle recognizes that collateral damage is "legally
accepted as it is unintended and perhaps unavoidable. 83 As a practical
82 Id. art. 57.
83 Ove Bring, International Humanitarian Law After Kosovo: Is Lex Lata
Sufficient?, 78 INT'L L. STUD. 257, 262 (2002). See also Discussion, 78 INT'L
L. STUD., 211, 215 (2002), where Yoram Dinstein explains:
The issue of collateral damage to civilians is tied in with that
of proportionality. The phrase proportionality is often
misunderstood. Protocol I does not mention proportionality at
all. The only expression used there is "excessive." The
question is whether the injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects is excessive compared to the military
advantage anticipated. Many people tend to confuse excessive
with extensive. However, injury/damage to non-combatants
can be exceedingly extensive without being excessive, simply
because the military advantage anticipated is of paramount
importance.
See also Bring, supra, at 262.
The principle of proportionality flows from the prohibition
against indiscriminate attacks. In fact, Article 51(5)(b)
prohibits an "attack which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated." Although the term "proportionality" is not used,
the text clearly conveys a proportionality message. The
principle expressed here is arguably a codification of
traditional customary law. In this context the concept of
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matter, collateral damage can also occur in a variety of other situations:
"in some cases because of human error, in some cases because of a
mechanical error in a weapons system and in some cases, the situation on
the battlefield is confused enough that people make mistakes. 84
From the very outset, the AP I codification of the proportionality
principle has generated significant controversy and confusion. First,
several states party to AP I made official reservations or understandings
concerning the proportionality principle due to "fears that commanders
might be subject to accusations of war crimes not based on an
understanding of the fact that in war commanders have to take action on
the basis of imperfect information."85  Italy, for example, made an
understanding regarding AP I Articles 51 to 58, making it clear that "the
military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or
executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their
assessment of the information from all sources which is available to them
at the relevant time. 86  Italy has also understood the term "military
advantage," found in both AP I Articles 51 and 57, to mean that the
military "advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and
not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack., 87  Other states
have adopted Italy's understandings outright or submitted similar
understandings.88
"collateral damage" is always referred to, although that
terminology is not used either in the Protocol. The language
of Article 51 focuses on what may be called "incidental
damage," a certain amount of which is legally accepted as it is
unintended and perhaps unavoidable in the circumstances at
the time.
Id.
84 U. S. Dep't of Defense, News Transcript: Background Briefing on Targeting
(Mar. 5, 2003), at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t03052003_t305targ.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2005) [hereinafter DoD Background Briefing on Targeting].
85 DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 74, at 420. In fact, Protocol I
"has been the subject of more declarations and reservations than any other
agreement on the laws of war." Id.
86 Id. at 507.
87 Id.
88 See id. at 499-512 for a complete listing of all AP I reservations and
understandings.
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Second, the question whether the proportionality test is customary
international law is also controversial.89 While some question whether the
proportionality principle as codified in AP I represents customary
international law,90 others view it as customary, but note that there is a lack
of consensus as to what the rules actually mean.9' Along this line, one
analysis is that while the core provisions of the rules are customary, many
of the newer AP I additions may not be.92
89 Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, AM. J.
INT'L. L. 391 (1993). "The extent to which the of Article 51, paragraph 5(b) and
Article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii) and (b) of Protocol I represent the customary
position is controversial." Id. at 408.
90 W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REv. 1, 173 (1990).
See also Major Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Faqade: A Critical Look at
the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51
A.F. L. REv. 143 (2001) regarding Article 52 and customary international law.
91 Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare,
2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 148-50 (1999). "Although certain
countries, most notably the United States, have failed to ratify the Protocol, they
generally concur that its core provisions on discrimination express customary
principles of international law." Id. at 148. "Thus, while there is general
agreement that the Protocol accurately states customary law principles, notable
disagreement persists over exactly what those standards are." Id. at 150.
Additionally, in footnote 24, Schmitt cites "unofficial, but probative statements"
of U.S. State Department attorneys to support his contention that the U.S. views
the principles generally as customary international law. Id. at 148. Regarding
the lack of agreement on what AP I means, see also Parks, supra note 90, at 174
("Following more than a decade of research and meetings of international
military legal experts who are anxious to implement the language contained in
Protocol I to the extent it advances the law of war and the protection of the
civilian population, there remains a substantial lack of agreement as to the
meaning of the provisions in Protocol I relating to proportionality.").
92 See Fausto Pocar, To What Extent Is Protocol I Customary International
Law?, 78 INT'L L. STUD. 337, 347 (2002). He writes:
While most of Protocol I can undoubtedly be regarded as
essentially reflecting customary international law, there are
areas where this conclusion is subject to debate for two
reasons. First, Protocol I clearly sets forth some new rules.
Secondly, the specificity of Protocol I's provisions add new
elements to principles that, while well established in
customary law, leave margins of discretion . . . . if they are
given certain interpretations. The scope and impact of these
additions is therefore controversial and may be the basis for
the hesitations of some States to ratify Protocol I.
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A third source of controversy concerning proportionality in AP I is
the inherent subjectivity of the balancing test. A Commentary on AP I
acknowledged this issue:
The rule of proportionality clearly requires that those
who plan or decide upon attack must take into account
the effects of the attack on the civilian population in
their pre-attack estimate. They must determine whether
those effects are excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated. Obviously the
decision will have to be based on a balancing of: (1) the
foreseeable extent of incidental or collateral civilian
casualties or damage, and (2) the relative importance of
the military objective as a target. As both sides of the
equation are variables, and as they involve a balancing
of different values which are difficult to compare the
judgment must be subjective. In the final analysis,
however, most decisions on the major political,
economic, and social affairs of societies as well as major
military decisions rest on the subjective judgment of
decision makers based on the weighing of factors which
cannot be quantified. The best that can be expected of
the decision maker is that he acts honestly and
competently. This action must be judged on the basis of
facts and circumstances available to him at the time, not
on the basis of hindsight. Despite the impossibility of
quantifying the factors of the equation, a plain and
manifest breach of the rule will be recognizable. 93
One criticism regarding the subjective nature of the balancing
test is that it calls for the balancing of two disparate interests: military
objectives and protecting civilians.94 It is exceedingly challenging to
Id.
93 MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 310 (1982).
94 Gardam, supra note 89, at 409 ("The key to the dilemma is the subjective
nature of assessing proportionality. It requires balancing between two opposing
goals: the swift achievement of the military goal with the minimum losses of
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assess these interests, balance one against the other, and make a
determination that the civilian damage is "excessive" in relation to the
military advantage. 95 Therefore, given the subjective nature of the test,
parties can reach contrasting conclusions as to how the balance should be
struck in particular circumstances.96
A fourth criticism of the proportionality test is its vagueness on
how to determine a breach. When applied in a criminal law setting, the
proportionality test in AP I's vagueness becomes a clear problem. Recall
the last sentence in the Commentary extract above, "Despite the
impossibility of quantifying the factors of the equation, a plain and
manifest breach of the rule will be recognizable. 97  This seemingly
invokes an "I know it when I see it"98 standard for discerning violations
of the balancing test. Such an approach does not provide advance notice
to military personnel on precisely when one's conduct in a military
operation will cross into the realm of prohibited criminal misconduct,
especially in situations where applying the balancing test does not yield a
clear and easy answer. 99 In this regard, some have questioned whether
one's own combatants and the protection of the other party's civilian
population.").
95 Julian J.E. Schutte, The System of Repression of Breaches of Additional
Protocol I, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD
177, 191 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991). ("It is virtually
impossible to tell in abstracto under what circumstances losses are excessive or
disproportionate."). See also Schmitt, supra note 91, at 150-51. In describing
how difficult it is to assess and balance civilian damage in relation to military
advantage, Schmitt states:
When performing proportionality calculations, the actor must
not only struggle with issues of inclusiveness (what are the
concrete and direct consequences?), but he must also conduct
a difficult jurisprudential balancing test. Optimally, balancing
tests compare like values. However, proportionality
calculations are heterogeneous, because dissimilar value
genres-military and humanitarian-are being weighed
against each other. How, for example, does one objectively
calculate the relative weight of an aircraft, tank, ship, or
vantage point in terms of human casualties?
Id.
96 Schmitt, supra note 91, at 157.
97 Bothe et. al., supra note 93, at 310.
98 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S. Ct. 1676, 1683, 12 L. Ed. 2d 793
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
99 Schmitt, supra note 91, at 170.
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the test would satisfy the U.S. constitutional test prohibiting criminal
statutes that are "void for vagueness."
100
Yet despite all of the criticism surrounding the proportionality
principles, they do provide an analytical framework for military
commanders and planners. Using the balancing test and applying the
precautionary principles, commanders and planners are required to factor
the potential for civilian casualties into the equation before acting. This
process ensures that commanders and planners will not engage in what
could be viewed as intentional attacks on protected civilians. 0 1 In this
The inherent complexity of the principle of discrimination
should by now be apparent. At the most basic level, targeting
civilians and civilian objects is prohibited. Additionally, there
are certain situations in which all reasonable actors would
agree on the proportionality balance. No one would suggest,
for example, that capturing a single low-ranking soldier would
justify the death of hundreds of civilians. Similarly, the
military advantage of destroying a command and control
center would seldom be outweighed by damage to an
uninhabited building. The complexity emerges when one
moves from these extremes along the proportionality
continuum toward the center. It is here that dissimilar
valuation paradigms clash.
Id.
'00 Parks, supra note 90, at 173. Bolton also addresses the void for vagueness
issue as applied to the RS version of the AP I proportionality principles:
It is precisely this risk that has led our Supreme Court to
invalidate State and Federal criminal statutes that fail to give
adequate notice of exactly what they prohibit under the 'void
for vagueness' doctrine. Unfortunately, 'void for vagueness'
is a largely American shield for civil liberties... How will
these vague phrases be interpreted? Who will advise a
President that he is unequivocally safe from the retroactive
imposition of criminal liability if he guesses wrong?
Bolton, supra note 4, at 190.
101 Parks, supra note 90, at 174. Parks points out how as a result of the
proportionality test, military planners will evaluate whether their attacks
constitute intentional attacks on civilians:
Proportionality does not establish a separate standard, but
serves as a means for determining whether a nation or military
commander responsible for planning, deciding upon, or
executing a military operation has engaged in the intentional
attack of civilians not engaged in the hostilities.
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sense, the proportionality principle has been clearly regarded as a part of
the customary practice of states. For example, the United States viewed
the principle as "a codification of the customary practice of nations"
during the Gulf War and applied the proportionality test to the planning
and conducting of its own military operations.10 2 More recently, William
H. Taft, the Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State, stated that since
9/11, U.S. military forces have "assiduously adhered to the traditional
rules associated with the use of military force, laid out in the Hague
Regulations of 1907 and in customary international law" such as
"elements of the Additional Protocols of 1977, including Articles 48 to
52 and Article 57 ." °3 Moreover, the proportionality principle can be
found in U.S. military manuals and regulations as a standard that must be
followed. 10 4 In some cases, the language used is substantially similar, if
not identical, to the language from AP I. For example, Army Field
Manual 27-10, the Law of Land Warfare, provides that:
(L)oss of life and damage to property incidental to
attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage expected to be gained.
Those who plan or decide upon an attack, therefore,
Proportionality as used in this context constitutes
acknowledgment of the inevitability of incidental or collateral
damage and injury in war.
Id.
102 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO TITLE V OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORIZATION AND PERSONNEL BENEFITS ACT OF 1991, app.
0, at 611 (Apr., 1992). "Some targets were specifically avoided because the
value of destruction of each target was outweighed by the potential risk to
nearby civilians or, as in the case of certain archaeological sites, to civilian
objects." Id. at 611-12.
103 William H. Taft, IV, Current Pressures on International Humanitarian Law.
The Law ofArmed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L
L. 319, 322 (2003).
104 THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 179 (1998) (referring
to language in the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy Commander Handbooks). In
addition, the 2002 U.S. Army Operational Law Handbook refers to the
incorporation of the proportionality principles into the Army Field Manual and
states that the United States considers the proportionality principles of AP I as
customary international law. U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK
(2002).
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must take all reasonable steps to ensure not only that the
objectives are identified as military objectives or
defended places... but also that these objectives may be
attacked without probable losses in lives and damage to
property disproportionate to the military advantage
anticipated.'05
Similarly, Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, defines
collateral damage as: "Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to
persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the
circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as
it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated
from the attack.,
106
However, a critical distinction must be made between using the
proportionality principles to guide military operations and the criminal
consequences stemming from a violation of the proportionality
principles. In this regard, an analysis of Article 85 of AP I, "Repression
of breaches of the Protocols," reveals that only "willful" violations of AP
I Article 57(2)(a)(iii) must be treated in the same manner as a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions.10 7 Other violations of AP I do not
constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions unless they meet
the specific requirements of AP I Article 85.08 As a result, Article 85
significantly affects a state's responsibility to address violations.
105 DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
(1976), available at
http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296783-1/fm/27-
10/CHANGEI.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (documenting the above quoted
change to paragraph 41).
106 JOINT STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60: JOINT DOCTRINE FOR TARGETING, at
p. GL-5 (2002), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/el/newtpubs/jp3_60.pdf (last visited Feb. 23,
2005). See also DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31,
INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR
OPERATIONS 1-5 (1976), cited in MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN AIR OPERATIONS (2000), available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1175/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2005)
(adopting Article 57 from AP I in an almost verbatim manner).
107 AP I, supra note 75, art. 85.
'0' Id. Article 85(1), entitled "Repression of Breaches of this Protocol," states,
"The provisions of the Conventions relating to the repression of breaches and
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AP I Article 85(3)(b) effectively makes a "willful" violation of
AP I Article 51(5)(b) a "grave breach" of AP I.109 While AP I Article 85
refers to the AP I Article 57 definition of an indiscriminate attack, the
definition in AP I Article 85 essentially incorporates AP I Article
51 (5)(b) with the addition of the willful requirement and the knowledge
element discussed below. Also, the same exact language that AP I
Article 85(3)(b) adopts from AP I Article 57 is found in AP I Article
51.110 Since AP I Article 85(1) applies the Geneva Convention "grave
breach" provisions to "grave breaches" of AP I, a willful violation of AP
I Article 51 (5)(b) has the same effective status of a grave breach of the
Geneva Convention. Accordingly, the same requirements set forth in
Article 146 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, for example, would
apply."' The Geneva Convention thus requires the Contracting Party to
grave breaches, supplemented by this Section, shall apply to the repression of
breaches and grave breaches of this Protocol."
109 Id. Article 85(3)(b) of AP I states:
In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the
following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this
Protocol, when committed willfully, in violation of the
relevant provisions of the Protocol, and causing death or
serious death or serious injury to body or health: (b) launching
an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or
civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause
excessive loss of life, injury to civilian objects, as defined in
Article 57, paragraph 2(a) (iii).
I0 ld. art. 51.
I Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra
note 74, at 299, 352. Article 146 states:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the
following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the
obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or
to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and
shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before
its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance
with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons
over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned,
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prosecute or extradite willful violations of AP I Article 51(5)(b).
Because of this prosecute or extradite requirement, grave breaches are
considered to possess universal jurisdiction. 
1 2
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima
facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures
necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the
provisions of the present Convention other than the grave
breaches defined in the following Article.
112 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 115-
18(2001).
With respect to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the
"grave breaches" are contained in Articles 50, 51, 130, and
147, respectively. With respect to Protocol I, "grave breaches"
are contained in Article 85. There are, however, no provisions
in these Conventions that specifically refer to universal
jurisdiction. One can assume that the penal duty to enforce
includes implicitly the right of the State Parties to exercise
universal jurisdiction under their national laws.
Id. at 116 (citations omitted). Professor Bassiouni further writes:
While no convention dealing with the law of armed
conflict contains a specific provision on universal jurisdiction,
it is nevertheless valid to assume that the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I provide a sufficient basis for states
to apply universality of jurisdiction to prevent and repress the
"grave breaches" of the Conventions. But none of the other
conventions dealing with the law of armed conflict contain a
provision on universal jurisdiction.
Customary international law as reflected in the
practice of states does not, so far, in the judgment of this
writer, warrant the conclusion that universal jurisdiction has
been applied in national prosecutions. There are a few cases
in the practice of states that are relied upon by some scholars
to assert the opposite, but such cases are so few and far
between that it would be incorrect to conclude that they
constitute practice. Nevertheless, it can be argued that
customary international law can exist irrespective of state
practice if there is strong evidence of opiniojuris, which is the
case with respect to war crimes.
The recognition of universal jurisdiction for war
crimes is essentially driven by academics' and experts'
writings, which extend the universal reach of war crimes to the
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To constitute a grave breach of AP I under AP I Article 85(3), a
violation of the proportionality principles must, as stated, be "committed
willfully" and, if it is an "indiscriminate attack," the attack must also be
committed with the "knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss
of life, injury, to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in
Article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii)""' 3 (emphasis added). This language
contrasts with AP I Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(b) which define
indiscriminate attacks as attacks that "may be expected to cause"
excessive or incidental losses.1 14 (Emphasis added.) Consequently, with
the additional intent and knowledge requirements, a grave breach of AP I
for violating the proportionality principles is practically the same as an
intentional attack on the protected civilian population.'"
5
universality of jurisdiction over such crimes. The 1949
Geneva Conventions require state parties to "respect and
ensure respect," while the "grave breaches" provisions of the
Conventions and Protocol 1 require enforcement. This has
been interpreted by some not only as giving parties the right to
adopt national legislation without universal jurisdiction, but
also as creating an obligation to do so.
Id. at 117-18 (citations omitted).
113 AP I, supra note 75, art. 85(3).
114 Id. arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(b). In comparing a breach of the proportionality
principles with a grave breach
[t]here exists, however, one difference. The attack is already
illegitimate if it may be expected to cause such losses. A high
degree of precaution is required. A grave breach on the other
hand presupposes more: the knowledge (not only the
presumption) that such attack will cause excessive losses in
kind. In this respect, subpara[graphs] (b) and also (c) (of
Article 85(3)) require a higher degree of intention than Art.
57.
See BOTHE ET AL., supra note 93, at 516.
115 Parks, supra note 90, at 173.
This leads one to conclude that the concept of proportionality
(as it is codified in Protocol I) is not violated unless acts have
occurred that are tantamount to the direct attack of the civilian
population, a violation of articles 48 and 51(2), or involve
wanton negligence that is tantamount to an intentional attack
of the civilian population.
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The distinction between a grave breach of AP I Article 85 and a
non-grave breach of AP I Articles 51 or 57 is significant. On one hand,
as noted above, a grave breach is considered an offense of universal
jurisdiction that imposes a duty for a state to prosecute or extradite an
offender. Conversely, while AP I Article 86(1) requires state parties to
"take measures necessary to suppress" non-grave breaches, it "leaves the
method for preventing such breaches to the discretion of the parties who
may use administrative or disciplinary sanctions as well as penal
sanctions."' 16
The difference between a grave breach and a non-grave breach
of AP I may help explain why states that have not ratified AP I, such as
the U.S., have generally viewed the proportionality principle as
customary international law despite the difficulties in applying the
balancing test. Specifically, because states possess the discretion to
resolve non-grave breach violations, and they may choose to use a non-
criminal method in doing so, they may be less concerned about potential
criminal liability for their military personnel for questionable or
uncertain violations of the proportionality principles. For example, if a
case appears to potentially violate AP I Article 51 or AP I Article 57, but
does not rise to the level of an AP I Article 85(3) violation, the state
controls the outcome and retains full flexibility. If the violation is
debatable, a state can use an administrative approach to resolve the
situation (by conducting an investigation, for example)."' In other
116 AP I, supra note 75, art. 86(1) ("The High Contracting Parties and the Parties
to the conflict shall repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to
suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result
from a failure to act when under a duty to do so."). Waldemar A. Solf, War
Crimes and the Nuremburg Principle, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 359, 378
(John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990). See also Schutte, supra note 95, at 178
("Apart from this, each Contracting Party is under the obligation to take the
necessary measures for the suppression of all breaches other than grave
breaches. Such suppression, however, need not exclusively be effected through
the application of criminal law.").
117 See Press Release, United States Central Command, Palestine Hotel
Investigation Concludes (Aug. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/NewsRelease.asp?NewsRelease=20
030829.txt (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). The release discusses an incident in Iraq
where civilian journalists were unintentionally killed during combat in Baghdad.
Below is an except from the press release:
Conclusions: A Company was under heavy enemy
attack. The company had positive intelligence that they were
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words, because a state does not have to worry about any obligation to
extradite or prosecute in a non-grave breach setting, there is less
apprehension that another state will second guess the state's military
actions and seek extradition.
This is relevant to the present discussion because the Rome
Statute effectively adopts the grave breach version of AP I Article 85(3).
RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) prohibits indiscriminate attacks that are launched
"intentionally" with the "knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury. ' 18 The Rome Statute drafters
specifically did not include the AP I grave breach offense in a section
with the other grave breaches adopted from the Geneva Conventions
contained in RS Article 8(a), in part due to the "ongoing uncertainty" of
AP 1.119 In addition, the Rome Statute drafters added the word "clearly"
to modify "excessive" and the word "overall" to modify "military
advantage" so the Article makes it plain that civilian losses must be
"clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated." The addition of the word "clearly" reflects a
under direct observation from an enemy/hunter killer team.
The activities on the balcony of the Palestine Hotel were
consistent with that of an enemy combatant. They fired a
single round in self-defense in full accordance with the Rules
of Engagement. The enemy had repeatedly chosen to conduct
its combat activities from throughout the civilian areas of
Baghdad.
These actions included utilizing the Palestine Hotel
and the areas immediately around it as a platform for military
operations. Baghdad was a high intensity combat area and
some journalists had elected to remain there despite repeated
warnings of the extreme danger of doing so. The journalists'
death at the Palestine Hotel was a tragedy and the United
States has the deepest sympathies for the families of those
who were killed.
118 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
119 SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 50. ("Unlike the four Conventions which have
enjoyed near-universal ratification, Protocol Additional I still enjoys far less
unanimity, and its reflection in Article 8 of the Rome Statute testifies to the
ongoing uncertainty with respect to its definitions of 'grave breaches."'). See
also KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 139 (2001)
("The reason why Article 8(2)(1) of the ICC Statute is confined to the grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions only is because AP I has not enjoyed
the same universal acceptance as the four Geneva Conventions.").
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concern over too easily criminalizing military judgment calls while the
word "overall" is consistent with the numerous reservations state parties
made to AP 1.120 The elements of the RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) show how
these changes are incorporated:
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) War crime of excessive incidental
death, injury, or damage. Elements: (1) The perpetrator
launched an attack. (2) The attack was such that it
would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or
damage to the natural environment and that such death,
injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated. (3) The
perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental
death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects
or widespread, long-term and severe damage would be
of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct overall military advantage
120 Didier Pfirter, Article 8(2)(b)(iv)-Excessive Incidental Death, Injury, or
Damage, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 65, at 147, 148.
These additions resulting from lengthy negotiations prior to
the Rome Conference were deemed to be appropriate in view
of the fact that the Statute does not merely deal with outlawing
certain military conduct, but with the criniinalization of
individual behavior, which in this case will always be a matter
of appreciation under often strenuous circumstances. The
term 'clearly' is designed to underline that a value judgment
within a reasonable margin of appreciation should not be
criminalized nor second guessed by the Court from hindsight.
The term 'overall' was designed to reflect the interpretation
given to article 51 of Additional Protocol I in some
commentaries as well as by parties to it through interpretative
statements.
Id. See also Meron, supra note 65, at 52, who writes:
[RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv)] requires, for the criminalization of an
attack launched in the knowledge that such attack will cause
an excessive damage to civilians or to the natural
environment, that the attack be "clearly excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated." The words which I italicize indicate departure
from Protocol I language and constitute a certain clarification
of the Protocol's principle of proportionality, rather in line
with reservations made by several NATO powers.
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anticipated. (4) The conduct took place in the context
of and was associated with an international armed
conflict. (5) The perpetrator was aware of factual
circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflict. (Emphasis added.) 2'
Additionally, two footnotes were added to the elements to provide
further guidance. "Concrete and direct overall military advantage" is
defined as the "military advantage that is foreseeable by the perpetrator
at the relevant time."'22 The other footnote clarifies that in proving the
knowledge requirement "the requisite information available to the
perpetrator at the time" must be considered.'23
What effect will the adoption of the grave breach version of the
proportionality principle coupled with the Rome Statute additions have
on RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv)? Will the heightened knowledge and intent
requirements dissuade an ICC Prosecutor from pursuing all but the most
egregious cases? Before turning to two case studies that serve as a
framework to see how these issues have been dealt with previously, let
us now review the rise of human rights NGOs and their role in pursuing
claims of war crimes in collateral damage cases.
121 See Pfirter, supra note 120 at 147-48 (citations omitted).
122 Id. at 148 n.36. The footnote provides:
The expression "concrete and direct overall military
advantage" refers to a military advantage that is foreseeable by
the perpetrator at the relevant time. Such advantage may or
may not be temporally or geographically related to the object
of the attack. The fact that this crime admits the possibility of
lawful incidental injury and collateral damage does not in any
way justify any violation of the law applicable in armed
conflict. It does not address justifications for war or other
rules related to jus ad bellum. It reflects the proportionality
requirement inherent in determining the legality of any
military activity undertaken in the context of an armed
conflict.
123 Id. at 148 n.37 ("As opposed to the general rule set forth in paragraph 4 of the
General Introduction, this knowledge element requires that the perpetrator make
the value judgment as described therein. An evaluation of that value judgment
must be based on the requisite information available to the perpetrator at the
time.").
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IV. Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)
NGOs have existed, in some form, for ages. Commentators cite
the Catholic Church, labor unions, 124 and the International Committee of
the Red Cross as early examples of NGOs.'25 Recently, though,
international human rights NGOs have played extremely influential roles
in the development and enactment of treaties such as the Ottawa
Convention banning Landmines and the Rome Statute. One
commentator has called this trend the "new diplomacy."'126 While some
question the NGOs source of legitimacy in this process, 127 the growing
power of NGOs in the law of war arena cannot be denied. Moreover, a
"wide chasm" between NGOs and the U.S. military has emerged over
their respective understandings of the legal obligations regarding
collateral damage.128 Accordingly, this section traces the growth of NGO
influence, and the general NGO attitude towards collateral damage
standards, to provide the necessary background before analyzing the
NGO role in the Kosovo and Iraq military operations.
124 Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the International Stage, 2 HOFSTRA L. &
POL'Y SYMP. 19, 25 (1997).
125 Betina Kuzmarov, An Uneasy Synergy: The Relationship Between Non-
Governmental Organizations and the Criminal Court, 11 WINDSOR R. OF LEGAL
& SOC. ISSUES 7, 22-23 (2001) Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are
[p]rivate organizations (Associations, Federations, Institutes,
Groups) not established by a government or by international
agreement, which are capable of playing a role in international
affairs by virtue of their activities, and whose members enjoy
individual voting rights. The members of an NGO may be
individuals (private citizens) or bodies corporate. Where the
organization or membership activity is limited to a specific
State, one speaks of a national NGO and where they go
beyond an international NGO.
Id. at 21-22.
126 David Davenport, The New Diplomacy, POL'Y REV., Dec. 2002, available at
http://www.policyreview.org/dec02/davenport.htnl (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
127 Id. See also Anderson, infra note 137 at 112.
128 See CARR CENTER FOR HUM. RTS. POL'Y, UNDERSTANDING COLLATERAL
DAMAGE WORKSHOP 9-12, 23 (June 4-5, 2002), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%2OPapers/WebJuneRepor
t.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2005) [hereinafter WORKSHOP: UNDERSTANDING
COLLATERAL DAMAGE].
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NGOs have recently emerged as significant participants in the
international arena. 129  Instead of focusing exclusively on lobbying
domestic governments, NGOs now increasingly seek to wield their
influence and power in an international setting. 13  Particularly in the
field of human rights and the law of war, NGOs have become more and
more important. Over time, NGOs such as Amnesty International (Al)
and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have moved from concentrating purely
on human rights issues to greater involvement in the law of war.13 ' For
129 Jeremy Rabkin, The Politics of the Geneva Conventions: Disturbing
Background to the ICC Debate, 44 VA. J. INT'LL. 169, 187 (2003).
130 See Spiro, supra note 124, at 25.
131 Rabkin, supra note 129, at 186-87.
New advocacy groups like Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch gradually shifted their focus from
peacetime safeguards of human rights to the emerging new
law of armed conflict. It was, in many ways, an entirely
logical progression for such groups. Amnesty International
started in London in the 1960s with a narrow focus on
denouncing torture, and played a prominent role in the 1970s
in mobilizing support for (and by some accounts, even helping
to draft specific provisions of) the UN Convention against
Torture. It was a short step to advocacy on behalf of restraints
in armed conflict, since some of the worst perpetrators of
torture were governments engaged in conflicts with guerilla
insurgencies.
The New York-based Human Rights Watch, which
started in the 1970s as a monitor of human rights abuses in
Eastern Europe, expanded in the 1980s to monitor abuses in
Latin America and Asia. It found that some of the worst
human rights abuses were committed in these latter regions by
governments struggling against guerilla insurgencies (most
notably in Central America). Since the human rights
conventions included special exceptions for threats to public
order, Protocol I seemed to be a very valuable instrument for
bridging the gap. International humanitarian law was
accordingly taken up with enthusiasm by America's Watch in
the 1980s as a tool for criticizing the regimes in El Salvador
and Guatemala.
Debate over Protocol I, particularly in the United
States, helped to draw a new generation of academic
specialists to the study of international humanitarian law.
What had once been a very narrow, technical specialty of
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example, NGOs played a vital role in the creation of both the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention),'32
and the Rome Statute.
NGO participation in the Ottawa Convention and the Rome
Statute reflects what one commentator describes as "the new
diplomacy."13 3 Traditionally, treaties involving the law of war or arms
control have been characterized by a slow, thorough, and deliberate
negotiating process designed to achieve a consensus among a large
number of states. 134 In contrast, the Ottawa Convention represented a
dramatic departure from the traditional paradigm. In the 1990s, state
parties of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, through the established treaty making process, attempted to
develop an international treaty placing limits and restrictions on the
utilization of antipersonnel landmines. 135 However, international NGOs
did not approve of the negotiations' meticulous pace, nor of the goal of
merely restricting the use of landmines (as opposed to the absolute ban
that NGOs favored).136
military lawyers emerged in the 1980s as a broader and more
intriguing field for international law scholars, many of whom
were themselves engaged in public advocacy. The traditional
sense that the Geneva Conventions represented a special
understanding among professional militaries was increasingly
eroded, as humanitarian law came to be seen as no more than a
special branch of general human rights law.
Id. (citations omitted). Further information about these NGOs,
Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), is
available on their respective websites, http://www.amnesty.org/ and
http://www.hrw.org/.
132 See The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Ant-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, September, 18,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (entered into force March 1, 1999) [hereinafter The
Ottawa Convention].
133 Davenport, supra note 126.
134 id.
135 Id.
136 Id. See also P.J. Simmons, Learning to Live with NGOs, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Fall 1998, at 82, 90. ("Steeped in a culture that encourages adversarial attitudes
to the powers that be, many NGOs seem best suited to confrontation, a
characteristic that some U.S. policymakers seized on in noting that the NGO
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Accordingly, international NGOs took the lead in pressuring
states to adopt a treaty banning the use of land mines. Several NGOs
formed an umbrella NGO, the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines, which grew to include over 1200 NGOs from all over the
world.1 37 These NGOs exerted tremendous pressure upon "like-minded"
states to agree upon an absolute ban on land mines. 3 8 A combination of
NGO pressure and co-operation with these like-minded states facilitated
coalition against landmines might have won U.S. support (and hence a stronger
treaty) if it had been more patient and willing to compromise.").
137 Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of
International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International
Civil Society, 11 EUR. J.INT'L L. 91, 104-05 (2000).
[T]he international campaign to ban landmines began
entirely--one hesitates to use so strong a word, but in this case
it is applicable-as an effort of international NGOs. The
initial steps began with the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC); its surgeon staff particularly, alarmed at the
sharp increase during the 1980s in the number of landmine
victim limb amputations, persuaded the ICRC to raise the
issue in its diplomatic, legal and public awareness efforts. The
ICRC would be the first to admit that its nascent campaign had
comparatively minimal visibility until a coalition of
international NGOs with concerns about landmines arising
from very different standpoints, came together to initiate what
later became known as the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL).
Id. (citations omitted).
138 Id. at 107. Professor Anderson writes:
[T]he treaty process represented a new approach to
international lawmaking because - largely in response to NGO
pressures - once a core of influential governments had
endorsed the ban treaty, the negotiating principle was not the
usual method of arms control treaty negotiation on the
principle of obtaining consensus on each point along the way,
no matter how much the treaty had to be watered down or how
long it took. Instead, again on account of international NGO
pressures, sympathetic governments adopted a new principle
of negotiating a treaty among 'like-minded' states - in effect,
accepting the comprehensiveness of the international NGO
position and its refusal to compromise the essentials of the
landmines ban.
Id. (citation omitted).
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creating a treaty that was hastened by the adopting of an artificial
deadline. 139  NGOs experienced unprecedented negotiating influence
throughout the process as they were actively involved in every aspect of
the negotiations. 140 Numerous states even selected international NGO
personnel to serve as part of their official convention delegations.' 4' The
NGO efforts were successful, as the Ottawa Convention entered into
force in March 1999.142 Given the clear-cut success of the Ottawa
139 Davenport, supra note 126. Canada was one of the primary "like-minded"
states, and its foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, declared there would be a
treaty within 15 months from a preliminary conference.
A core group of states and NGOs highly committed to a
specific outcome in a compressed time frame was also a major
factor in the success of the new diplomacy. Such a process
may seem obvious to a corporate executive or a labor union
official, but it is not the way international agreements are
generally developed. Since international law is created when
individual states cede some of their rights to the whole, those
negotiations historically aim for unanimity, or at least a broad
consensus. To the NGOs passionately committed to their
agenda, however, such a process seemed destined to accept the
lowest common denominator. The vision of these treaty
proponents was quite different, reflected by the requirement of
a two-thirds majority vote, not a consensus. They were
prepared to accept less national participation, if necessary, in
order to keep the central content of their proposals intact.
Their refrain was to press for "a treaty worth having."
Id.
140 Id.
Once relegated to the hallways of official proceedings, the
NGOs at the meeting called in Ottawa were front and center,
advancing the agenda, drafting proposals, and pressuring the
delegates. In a survey of delegates following enactment of the
treaty, NGO pressure was cited as the No. 1 factor in states'
decisions to support the ban of land mines.
Id.
141 Anderson, supra note 137, at 112.
142 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT: TOWARD A MINE-
FREE WORLD (1999), at http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/english/exec/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2005). The report notes that
[s]eventy-one nations have ratified the Mine Ban Treaty as of
31 March 1999-more than half the signatories. Article 17
provides that the treaty shall enter into force on the first day of
the sixth month after the 40 h instrument of ratification has
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Convention from the NGO perspective, international NGOs sought to
replicate the success in other areas. 143 Kenneth Roth, the executive
director of Human Rights Watch, viewed the Ottawa Convention as the
prototype for future campaigns: "The landmines campaign...can be seen
as a model of what is to come... already the focus has shifted forward,
with NGOs looking to build similar partnerships with small and medium-
sized governments on other causes.' 4 4
In many ways, the ICC negotiation process closely resembled
that of the Ottawa Convention. In particular, NGOs wielded enormous
influence and were instrumental in the Rome Statute's creation. 45 An
been officially deposited. Burkina Faso became number forty
on 16 September 1998, triggering an entry into force date of 1
March 1999. This is believed to be the fastest entry into force
of any major treaty ever.
For more information on the Ottawa Convention, see The International
Campaign to Ban Landmines website, at http://www.icbl.org/.
14" Thomas Carothers, Civil Society, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1999-2000, at 18,
27. Carothers writes:
The recent success of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines, in which a coalition of NGOs (together with some
governments, in particular Canada's) took on the United States
and other powerful states, sparked tremendous interest in the
idea of transnational civil society. Activists, scholars,
journalists, and others began talking up the phenomenon of
advocacy across borders. Global civil society appears a
natural extension of the trend toward greater civil society
within country. At last count, more than 5,000 transnational
NGOs - NGOs based in one country that regularly carry out
activities in others - had been identified.
The phenomenon is significant. A confluence of
factors-the lowering of political barriers after the end of the
cold war, new information and communications technologies,
lowered transportation costs, and the spread of democracy-
has created a fertile ground for nongovernmental groups to
widen their reach and form multicountry links, networks, and
coalitions.
Id.
144 Anderson, supra note 137, at 110 (quoting Roth, New Minefields for NGOs."
After the War on Landmines, These Organizations Started New Campaigns,
NATION, Apr. 13, 1998, at 22).
145 Abram Chayes & Ann-Marie Slaughter, The ICC and the Future of the
Global Legal System, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
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umbrella NGO group, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court
(CICC), consolidated the efforts of over 1000 NGOs. 146  The NGOs
formed the largest single delegation at the Rome Conference. 147 NGOs
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International brought
delegations to the Rome Conference that were larger than numerous state
party delegations. 48 With their large and formidable presence, NGOs
played a pivotal role at the Rome Conference, attaining an unparalleled
degree of access into the negotiating process. 149  The NGOs were
"central players, involved in setting the agenda, drafting documents and
lobbying delegates," often meeting directly with like-minded state
representatives.15( A list of CICC activities provides a clear
demonstration of the extensive and thorough NGO involvement at the
Rome Conference:
- Broke into 13 working groups on the 128 articles of
the Statute;
- Assisted in the participation of 50-80 NGO experts
from developing and transitional countries;
- Convened regional caucuses, including the tri-
continental alliance formed by groups from Africa,
Latin America and Asia;
- Convened sectoral caucuses (i.e. gender justice,
victims, children, faith, peace):
- Issued reports for use by NGOs and governments;
- Translated documents and reports and provided
interpretation for NGOs, even some countries;
- Helped organize three news teams from the Inter-
press Service, the Advocacy Project and the CICC
CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 2, at 237, 241. "Without the NGO community,
the ICC treaty might not have been concluded. Organizations devoted to human
rights, women's rights, humanitarian assistance, social justice, and the
eradication or at least the diminution of the myriad forms of oppression, all
organized, lobbied, drafted, and negotiated to push governments in their desired
direction." Id.
146 Davenport, supra note 126.
14 William R. Pace, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court
and Non-Governmental Organizations, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 65, at 201.
4 Id. at 202.
149 BROOMHALL, supra note 29, at 73.
150 Davenport, supra note 126.
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Monitor, providing the conference's only two daily
newspapers and an on-line bulletin;
- Assisted governments by helping provide experts
and interns which were included as members of
government delegations;
- Executed effective co-ordination between Rome and
national networks;
- Held regular briefings for international and regional
press;
- Held daily Coalition General Strategy Sessions;
- Held weekly meetings with Rome Conference Chair;
- Held regular meetings with governments and
government groups, especially the Like Minded
Group of Countries whose membership expanded to
60 nations during the conference.15'
Another similarity with the Ottawa Process was the adoption of
an arbitrary deadline to complete the treaty. 5 2 This time, only five
weeks were allowed, thus making the treaty's adoption a surprise to
some. 53 Moreover, the treaty was presented to states as a "take it or
leave it proposal" with no room for states to ratify the treaty with
reservations or understandings. 1
5 4
The ICC's ratification proved to be another successful example
of the "new diplomacy." Mr. William Pace, the Convenor of CICC,
acknowledged the influence of the new diplomacy at the ceremony for
the new Chief Prosecutor of the ICC:
The Rome Statute and the ICC are premier examples of
a new process and model of making international law -
in which like-minded nations cutting across all regional
groupings, and NGOs from the South and the North and
representing many sectors of civil society, have worked
151 Pace, supra note 147, at 202.
152 See Davenport, supra note 126.
"' Leila Nadya Sadat, The Evolution of the ICC: From the Hague to Rome and
Back Again, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, supra note 2, at 31, 32.
154 Davenport, supra note 126.
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together to achieve an extraordinary treaty and the
strengthening of the international legal order. 1
55
While the new diplomacy has produced dramatic victories for
the international human rights NGO movement, many have questioned
the NGOs' legitimacy. 156 The NGOs' growing influence has prompted
some to ask, "Who elected these NGOs anyway?"' 15 7 NGOs can be
viewed as "special-interest groups" often focused on a narrow agenda.'
58
Portraying themselves as representatives of "civil society," in reality the
NGOs only represent their members who are typically "international
elites." 1 59 Thus the NGOs are accountable only to their constituents.
60
155 William R. Pace, Statement Made at the Ceremony for the Solemn
Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 1 (June
16, 2003), at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030616_pace.pdf (last
visited Feb. 23, 2005).
156 Davenport, supra note 126. See also Anderson, supra note 137, at 112.
157 Id.
158 Davenport, supra note 126.
159 Anderson, supra note 137, at 118.
International NGOs collectively are not conduits
from the "people" or the "masses" or the "world citizenry"
from the "bottom up." They are rather, a vehicle for
international elites to talk to other international elites about the
things-frequently of undeniably critical importance-that
international elites care about. The conversation is not
vertical, it is horizontal. It has a worthwhile, essential
function in making the world-sometimes at least, a better
place - but it does not reduce the democratic deficit.
Put bluntly, the glory of organizations of civil society
is not democratic legitimacy, but the ability to be a pressure
group. Organizations in civil society do not share a common
vision of the good, nor need concern themselves with the
common good, in any holistic fashion at all if they choose not
to. They have particular issues and particular constituencies.
But for that very reason, they are not the voice of democracy
and do not convey, at least in real democracies - rather than
faux legitimate systems like those of international
organizations - democratic legitimacy.
Id. See also John M. Powers, All Talk, No Action From World NGOs, INSIGHT,
Nov. 24, 2003, at http://www.findarticles.com/cfdle/m1571/2003_Nov_24/
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Moreover, the international NGOs have a relatively small constituency
and have been characterized as "an undemocratic pressure group,
accountable to no one but its own members and donors that wield
enormous power and influence. ' 66
A brief look at the World Federalist Movement may be
illustrative. The World Federalist Movement (WFM) served as the
secretariat for the Coalition for the International Criminal Court.
162
Among all of the NGOs present at the Rome Conference, WFM had the
largest delegation, "exceeding even the largest government
delegations. ' 63 Clearly then, WFM was at the forefront of the NGO
movement at the Rome Conference. WFM continues to serve as the
CICC secretariat and, thus, will continue to influence the ICC. 164 Yet,
what does WFM stand for, and whom does it represent? The WFM web
site reveals the organization seeks a form of world government with
pacifist and socialist overtones. 165 Moreover, the WFM exhorted the
110364126/print.jhtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2005) ("[T]he NGO sector tends to
be self-appointed, unaccountable and may in no way represent those whose
causes it claims to be championing.").
160 Davenport, supra note 126.
161 David Reiff, The Precarious Triumph of Human Rights, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
1999. See also Simmons, supra note 136, at 83 ("Hailed as the exemplars of
grassroots democracy in action, many NGOs are, in fact, decidedly
undemocratic and unaccountable to the people they claim to represent.
Dedicated to promoting more openness and participation in decision making,
they can instead lapse into old-fashioned interest group politics that produces
gridlock on a global scale.").
162 Pace, supra note 147, at 202 n.9.
163 Id.
'64 See CICC Background, at http://www.iccnow.org/introduction/
ciccbackground.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
165 See WFM Vision, at http://www.wfin.orgiVISION/Vision.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2005).
We call for an end to the rule of force through a
world governed by law, based on strengthened and
democratized world institutions. We are inspired by the
democratic principles of federalism.
World Federalists support the creation of democratic
global structures accountable to the citizens of the world.
World federalism calls for the division of international
authority among separate agencies, a separation of powers
among judicial, executive and parliamentary bodies.
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U.S. not to respond with "unilateral" force in self-defense following the
September 11, 2001 attacks. 66 Based on its income tax files, WFM
collected $59,915.00 in membership dues in 2001.67 WFM requires a
minimum annual donation of $30.00 from its members. 6' Therefore, if
one assumes that each member contributed the minimum amount, there
were less than 2,000 WFM members in the United States in 2001. The
membership number decreases further to the extent that members
contribute more than $30.00. Consequently, then, an NGO with a small
membership and views that can be safely depicted as outside the political
mainstream, at least in the United States, has maintained an extraordinary
amount of influence in the ICC.
While the source of NGO legitimacy may be questioned, the
power of the international NGO movement cannot be denied. American
University law professor Kenneth Anderson summarizes the growth of
NGO influence in the law of war arena:
For the past 20 years, the center of gravity in
establishing, interpreting and shaping the law of war has
gradually shifted away from the military establishments
of leading states and their "state practice." It has even
shifted away from the International Red Cross (invested
by the Geneva Conventions with special authority) and
toward more activist and publicly aggressive N.G.O.'s-
Id. See also WFM Statement of Purpose, at
http://www.wfm.org/VISION/SoP.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) (advocating
for "an end to the use and threat of use of military force; ...equitable
participation of all in the global economy and in global decisions which affect
their lives; .. . [and] "the emergence of a global ethos and a consciousness of
humanity and of every person as a citizen of one world").
166 See Statement of the World Federalist Movement in Response to the Terrorist
Attacks on September 11, 2001, at
http://www.wfm.org/ACTION/wfnistmt_terrorism.html (last visited Feb 24,
2005) ("However, WFM urges the United States government to resist calls to
engage in massive, unilateral military strikes against countries where terrorists
are suspected to reside.").
167 See WORLD FEDERALIST MOVEMENT, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT
FROM INCOME TAX (2001), at
http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2001/133/823/2001-133823538-1-
9.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2005) (listing, inter alia, membership dues collected).
16 See Join WFM, at http://www.wfm.org/ABOUT_WFM/memberinfo.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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including the ad hoc coalitions that produced the Ottawa
Treaty, banning land mines, and the new International
Criminal Court.
169
Consequently, given the growing authority of NGOs in the law of war,
the NGOs' views regarding collateral damage are clearly significant.
Commentators have characterized the NGO approach to
collateral damage as "absolutist" and "utopian," involving a "zero
tolerance" attitude towards unintended civilian casualties in combat.1
70
These attitudes are potentially at odds with the legal framework
surrounding collateral damage. In an effort to bridge the gap between
the NGO and military positions on the legal principles concerning
collateral damage, Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of
Government's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy held a workshop in
2002 titled "Understanding Collateral Damage.' 7' The workshop
brought together distinguished NGO representatives and senior military
officers. The workshop highlighted the "large, and in some important
respects, widening gap between the views of the human rights and the
U.S. military on the practical meaning of international humanitarian
law.' 72 In particular, one NGO participant gave credence to the belief
that many NGOs possess zero tolerance for civilian casualties: "As one
participant explained, the idea that a military strike can result in civilian
deaths but not constitute a legal violation 'doesn't resonate particularly
169 Kenneth Anderson, Who Owns the Rules of War?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13,
2003, §6 (Magazine) at 38, 43.
170 Id. at 43 ("More broadly in recent years, the N.G.O.'s have been promoting
an ever more utopian law of war, in keeping with absolutist human rights
ideology."). See also Daphne Eviatar, Civilian Toll: A Moral and Legal Bog,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, § D, at 7 ("'The human rights community is
absolutist at its core,' said Sarah Sewall, program director at the Carr Center and
former deputy assistant secretary of defense for peacekeeping and humanitarian
assistance in the Clinton administration .... She added, 'It's inherently more
complex than the human rights community approaches it."'); David B. Rivken
Jr. & Lee A. Casey, That's Why They Call It War, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2003,
at B04.("[Intemational human rights] NGOs suggest that U.S. armed forces,
precisely because they have better weapons, should be held to a higher standard
than less advanced militaries. This would apply particularly to the question of
civilian casualties, or 'collateral damage,' where a rule of near zero tolerance is
Promoted.
').
71 WORKSHOP: UNDERSTANDING COLLATERAL DAMAGE, supra note 128.
172 Id. at 9.
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well with our constituents."" 73 Moreover, the workshop revealed that
some NGOs are uncomfortable with core military principles involved in
the proportionality analysis such as military advantage. 74  These
attitudes caused concern among the military representatives at the
workshop, who believed NGOs often confuse or conflate policy
objectives (absolutely minimizing collateral damage) with legal
obligations (as discussed above, collateral damage is permitted as long as
it is not excessive in relation to "the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated"). 175
To summarize, it is clear that NGO influence in the law of war
has grown substantially within recent years. NGOs have been the leaders
in creating the International Criminal Court and many hold a view
regarding collateral damage that is potentially at odds with that of the
U.S. military. Let us now turn to two case studies that illustrate both the
U.S. military position and practice regarding collateral damage and the
critical NGO response.
V. Case Studies
In both the Kosovo and Iraq military operations, the U.S.
military made great efforts to minimize collateral damage. Nonetheless,
NGOs criticized these efforts and some filed war crimes allegations
either with an international prosecutor (Kosovo) or a national prosecutor
(Iraq). The article uses these military operations as case studies in order
to preview some of the issues the ICC Prosecutor will face. Each case
1 Id. at 16.
174 Id. at 9, 24. "Many representatives of human rights groups expressed a
fundamental unease with their ability to interpret or defme certain military
concepts in international humanitarian law (IHL) .... For example, some feel ill
equipped to define 'military advantage,' a concept with central relevance to
many other aspects of IHL." Id. at 9. "The human rights community, with a few
exceptions, claims the right to criticize military operations without assuming a
commensurate obligation to acquire military expertise." Id. at 24. Ms. Dinah
PoKempner, the General Counsel for HRW, in discussing the AP I
proportionality principle, wrote: "This is one of the bedrock limitations on the
ways and means of waging war, yet the terms of its formulation render it
opaque. Certainly most human rights advocates find themselves ill-equipped to
evaluate issues of military advantage, however direct and concrete." See Dinah
PoKempner, Collateral Damage: Assessing Violations from the Outside 1, at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Use/20of/ 2OForce/June%/202002/PoKemp
ner final.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
175 Id.
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study will review the U.S.'s endeavors to reduce collateral damage, the
NGO response, and how the NGO complaints were resolved.
A. Kosovo
From March to June 1999, the United States, as part of a
campaign with its NATO allies, began Operation Allied Force (OAF), an
air campaign designed to stop egregious Serbian violence in Kosovo. 176
The 78-day campaign succeeded not only by forcing Slobadan
Milogevid's Serbian forces from Kosovo, but also by setting the stage for
the return of refugees, and deploying a peacekeeping force in Kosovo.
17 7
Minimizing collateral damage formed a major feature of the campaign
and the Department of Defense characterized the campaign as "the most
precise military operation ever conducted," stating, "No military
operation of such size has ever inflicted less damage on unintended
targets., 178 Altogether, approximately 500 civilian deaths resulted from
38,400 sorties that released 23,614 air munitions.
79
General Wesley Clark, the U.S. commander of OAF, emphasized
the importance of minimizing collateral damage, stating that the need to
prevent civilian casualties was the "most pressing drumbeat of the
campaign."'"" OAF sought to minimize collateral damage through
reserving target approval to the highest military and political authorities
in situations involving potentially high collateral damage, ensuring the
legal review of targets at numerous levels of command, heavily relying
upon precision munitions, adopting stringent rules of engagement (ROE),
and adjusting the ROE following incidents of collateral damage.
General Clark describes the thorough target reviewing process
followed throughout the campaign:
116 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: KOSOVO/OPERATION
ALLIED FORCE AFTER-ACTION REPORT 1 (Jan. 31, 2000), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02O72000.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005)
[hereinafter Kosovo AAR].
177 Id. at xiii.
178 Id.
179 THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO THE
PROSECUTOR, 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1272 (June 8, 2000), available at
http://un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005)
[Hereinafter ICTY Final Report].
180 GENERAL WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR, BOSNIA, KoSovo,
AND THE FUTURE OF COMBAT 434 (2001).
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(W)e would need a complete analysis of each individual
target - location, military impact, possible collateral
damages, risks if the weapon missed the target, and so
forth. This analysis had to be repeated for different
types of weapons, in search of the specific type of
weapon and warhead size that would destroy the target
and have the least adverse impact elsewhere. And this
had to be done to my satisfaction, then sent to
Washington where it underwent additional levels of
legal and military review and finally ended up on
President Clinton's desk for his approval.'
81
Throughout the campaign, military lawyers were fully integrated
into the targeting process and ensured that targets were reviewed in
accordance with the law of war.' 82 The analysis of collateral damage
181 Id. at 201. See also Kosovo AAR, supra note 176, at xx.
During the course of the campaign, NATO developed
mechanisms for delegating target approval authority to
military commanders. For selected categories of targets-for
example, targets in downtown Belgrade, in Montenegro, or
targets likely to involve high collateral damage-NATO
reserved approval for higher political authorities. NATO
leaders used this mechanism to ensure that member nations
were fully cognizant of particularly sensitive military
operations, and thereby, to help sustain the unity of the
alliance.
Id.
182 See Tony Montgomery, Legal Perspective from the EUCOM Targeting Cell,
78 INT'L L. STUD. 189 (2002). Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery served on the
European Command (EUCOM) staff during Operation Allied Force as the
Deputy Staff Judge Advocate and Chief, Operational Law during Operation
Allied Force, and here provides a detailed analysis of the extensive operational
and legal analysis used for each target. He writes: "Of the nearly 2000 fixed
targets that were reviewed, each received an independent evaluation within the
requirements of the law of war. Is the target a military objective? What military
value or advantage is gained from destroying this target? Are we being
proportional? Are there any issues with distinction/discrimination?" Id. at 195.
See also Frederic de Mulinen, Distinction between Military and Civilian
Objects, in Kosovo AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A LEGAL
ASSESSMENT 103, 123 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 2002).
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"quickly became central to much of the targeting process."' 83
Operational planners used sophisticated computer simulation programs
to engage in a "four tier analysis" in an effort to completely capture the
potential amount of collateral damage in a given target. 8 4 Military and
civilian lawyers reviewed targets at the Combatant Command level
(European Command), for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
for the Secretary of Defense. 85 The National Security Counsel provided
The air campaign entailed an unprecedented review of
targeting with military, political and legal reviews. Legal
officers advising on operational law matters at each major
command headquarters, at NATO and in national commands
were involved in the targeting decisions. Attack of dual- use
facilities had to be approved at the highest level. The approval
of a target also included approval of ammunition to be used.
Wherever necessary, the appropriate choice of precision
guided ammunition was prescribed to avoid damaging the
civilian surroundings of the selected military targets.
Precautions relating to the targets themselves were intended to
minimize loss and damage on the civilian side, e.g. destruction
of part of a large building used for military purposes, cutting
off power or communications lines in such a way that
restoration could be rapidly achieved after the end of the air
strikes.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
183 See Montogmery, supra note 182, at 193.
184 Harvey Dalton, Commentary, 78 INT'L L. STUD. 199, 201 (2002).
The four-tier analysis tried to estimate the damage by
fragmentary blast, skin piercing fragments from the blast,
window breakage (because that could create a lot of damage
and incidental injury), building collapse (the possibility of
building collapse or which buildings would be expected to
collapse), and eardrum rupture, which obviously causes
civilian injuries. Those were the four types of injuries that
were modeled and simulated by computer with each type of
weapon that was considered as a possible weapon to be
employed. This made a lot of difference. It was all
visualized, displayed, and we could actually determine to a
reasonable degree the extent of the collateral damage.
Id.
185 Kosovo AAR, supra note 176, at 24.
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additional legal reviews for targets that were forwarded to President
Clinton for approval.
18 6
Moreover, rules of engagement were crafted to be "strict" to
further reduce the possibilities of civilian casualties."' A number of
attacks on previously approved targets were called off to avoid potential
collateral damage when the pilot could not make a positive identification
of the target. 188 Following incidents of unintended collateral damage, the
NATO leadership placed even more restrictions upon the campaign, even
at the expense of their military efforts.18 9
186 James E. Baker, Judging Kosovo: The Legal Process, the Law of Armed
Conflict, and the Commander in Chief, Address to the U.S. Naval War College,
in 78 INT'L L. STUD. 7 (2002).
187 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR: KOSOvO AND BEYOND 101 (2000).
Because of these legal constraints, the pilot's rules of
engagement were strict, "as strict as I have seen in twenty-
seven years," in the opinion of General Chuck Wald who
helped coordinate the approval of targets with the Joint Chiefs
in the Pentagon. Pilots could only fire on visual recognition of
a target-which meant that bad weather forced many sortie
cancellations-and they had to radio in to the air war
headquarters at Vicenza for a final approval when they saw a
target of opportunity.
Id.
188 BENJAMIM S. LAMBETH, NATO's AIR WAR FOR Kosovo, A STRATEGIC AND
OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT 139-140 (2001), available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1365/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
Similarly, there were "reported instances in which precision munitions in the
process of guiding were deliberately steered away from targets at the last minute
to avoid harming civilians who had not been seen in the target area until after
weapon release." Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
189 Lieutenant General Michael Short USAF (Ret.), Operation Allied Force from
the Perspective of the NATO Air Commander, Address to the U.S. Naval War
College, in 78 INT'L L. STUD 17 (2002). Lieutenant General Michael Short, the
NATO Air Commander during the Kosovo campaign, described the political
reaction following a bridge bombing that resulted in unintended civilian
casualties in May, 1999:
As a result of that incident, this was the guidance I got from
the very highest levels of the NATO military political
leadership: you will no longer bomb bridges in daylight, you
will no longer bomb bridges on market days, on holidays or on
weekends. In fact, you will only bomb bridges between ten
o'clock at night and three o'clock in the morning in order to
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To be sure, it was not a perfect operation by any means. NATO
recognized that "mistakes did occur during the bombing campaign;
errors of judgment may have also occurred."' 90 However, of the civilian
deaths, over 60% resulted from only 12 incidents in a campaign of
10,484 attack sorties. 19' Despite these efforts, some NGOs still
suggested the NATO campaign was guilty of war crimes.
NGOs such as HRW and Al wrote critical reports on the NATO
campaign. The Al report, "'Collateral Damage' or Unlawful Killings?
Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied
Force," was particularly disparaging. 192 Al stated that "NATO forces
violated the laws of war leading to cases of unlawful killing of civilians"
and that "Civilian deaths could have been significantly reduced if NATO
forces had fully adhered to the laws of war during Operation Allied
Force.' 93 The Al report seemingly implied that collateral damage by
itself violated the law of war, thus reflecting a zero tolerance policy
towards collateral damage:
ensure that we do not kill civilians crossing those
bridges... The restrictions that were placed on the young men
and women who were going in harm's way every day were
extraordinary--- losing all sight of what effect we were trying
to achieve. In fact, we got to the point that during the last ten
days of the war I was instructed to attack only those targets
that had a potential for low collateral damage.
Id. See also CLARK, supra note 180, at 444. ("By the end of May, NATO was
under sustained and intense pressure to avoid collateral damages. We simply
eliminated targets from our list and pared down the impact of the campaign.
The weight of public opinion was doing to us what the Serb air defense system
had failed to do: limit our strikes.").
190 ICTY Final Report, supra note 179, 90, at 1283.
191 De Mulinen, supra note 182, at 124.
192 AMNESTY INT'L, NATO/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA; "COLLATERAL
DAMAGE" OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY
NATO DURING OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (2000), at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/kosovo/docs/nato-all.pdf (last visited Mar.
1, 2005) [hereinafter AI KOSOvO REPORT].
193 Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, NATO violations of the laws of war during
Operation Allied Force must be investigated (July 6, 2000), at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur700252000 (last visited Mar. 1,
2005).
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Yet despite the safeguards against civilian casualties that
NATO said were in place, incidents continued to be
reported in which large numbers of civilians were killed.
In some cases, NATO admitted that it made mistakes,
but always said that it had not intentionally targeted
civilians. It attributed some mistakes to faulty
intelligence; others it blamed variously on bad weather
and poor visibility, faulty weapons which had missed
their targets, mistakes by pilots in deciding whether
vehicles were military or civilian in nature, and the use
of human shields by the FRY authorities to create
civilian casualties when facilities were bombed.
94
As discussed above, the reasons NATO provided for collateral damage
incidents were legitimate explanations for collateral damage.
Nonetheless, another statement from the Al report also reflects the
presumption that war crimes resulted from collateral damage: "Al
believes that - whatever their intentions - NATO forces did commit
serious violations of the laws of war leading in a number of cases to the
unlawful killings of civilians.' 95 This statement completely ignores the
elements of intent and knowledge that are central to proving a war crime
under the proportionality principle as incorporated in AP I.
In addition to the HRW and Al reports, numerous NGOs and
individuals filed complaints with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) for
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 196
The UN Security Council established the ICTY in 1993 through United
Nations Security Council Resolution 808.'97 Although the Security
194 Al Kosovo REPORT, supra note 192, at 26.
195 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
196 Aaron Schwabach, NATO's War in Kosovo and the Final Report to the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 9
TUL. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 167, 169 (2001).
197 See The Statue of the International Tribunal For the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 3217 th r mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter Statute of
the ICTY]. See also Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(May 3,1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S25704.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). The
Statute itself was adopted on May 25, 1993 through UN Security Council
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Council created the tribunal to address war crimes that occurred during
the Bosnian conflicts, Article 1 of the Statute of the International
Tribunal was broad enough to cover allegations against NATO forces for
any acts "committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia."'1 9' ICTY
Article 18 enabled the ICTY Prosecutor to start investigations based on
"information obtained from any source," including NGOs. 99 ICTY
Article 3 covered "Violations of the laws or customs of war" as a crime
under the ICTY.2 °° While the text of Article 3 is clearly based on the
Hague Conventions, an early ICTY case established that the Article
essentially incorporated the Geneva Conventions and AP 1.201
Louise Arbour, the ICTY Prosecutor at the time, decided to
investigate all of the allegations against NATO in May 1999.202 Arbour
Resolution 827. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993).198 Statute of The ICTY, supra note 197, art. 1. ("The International Tribunal
shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present
Statute.").
'99 Id. art. 18, 1. ("The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex-officio or on
the basis of information obtained from any source, particularly from
Governments, United Nations organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations. The Prosecutor shall assess the information received or obtained
and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed.").
200 Id. art. 3.
20 Al Kosovo REPORT, supra note 192, at 13-14 (citing the ICTY Tadid
opinion). "[I]t is understood that the 'laws and customs of war' referred to in
Article 3 include all obligations under humanitarian law agreements in force in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the time the acts were committed,
including common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977
Additional Protocols to these Conventions." Case IT-94-1-AR72, Prosecutor v.
Tadid, 88 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 2, 1995).
202 Press Release, ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor's Report on the
NATO Bombing Campaign (June 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICTY OTP Press
Release], at http://www.un.org./icty/pressreal/p51O-e.htm (last visited Mar. 1,
2005). The press release specifically cited the influence of NGOs: "In addition,
a number of reports and commentaries on the bombing campaign have been
published by human rights organizations and others, including the recent
Amnesty International Report." Id. Moreover, in the ICTY Final Report
recommendations, the committee emphasized not only its reliance on HRW, but
also on HRW's endorsement of the reports of NATO's opponent: "The
conmittee has also assigned substantial weight to factual assertions made by
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established a working group within the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to
examine the claims. 20 3 Almost a year later, the new ICTY Prosecutor,
Carla Del Ponte reported her conclusions to the UN Security Council:
Although some mistakes were made by NATO, I am
very satisfied that there was no deliberate targeting of
civilians or unlawful military targets by NATO during
the bombing campaign. I am now able to announce my
conclusion, following a full consideration of my team's
assessment of all complaints and allegations, that there is
no basis for opening an investigation into any of those
allegations or other incidents related to the NATO
bombing.2 °4
Del Ponte went beyond announcing her conclusions and even
205
authorized releasing the ICTY Prosecutor's committee report.
Human Rights Watch as it investigators did spend a limited amount of time on
the ground in the FRY. Further, the committee has noted that Human Rights
Watch found the two volume compilation of the FRY Ministry of Foreign
Affairs entitled NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia generally reliable and the
committee has tended to rely on the casualty figures for specific incident in this
compilation." ICTY Final Report, supra note 179, 90, 39 I.L.M. at 1282-83.
203 ICTY OTP Press Release, supra note 202.
204 Barbara Crossette, UN. War Crimes Prosecutor Declines to Investigate
NA TO, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2000, at A4.
205 ICTY OTP Press Release, supra note 202. Regarding the release of this
report:
It is not the Prosecutor's normal policy to make public the
details about investigations or allegations received but not
investigated. Standard practice is to comment only about
indictments that have been made public. Even then, any
comment by the Prosecutor outside the courtroom must be
extremely limited. The Prosecutor considers that individuals
against whom allegations are made should, under normal
circumstances, be entitled to the presumption of innocence.
The good reputation of innocent persons would undoubtedly
be damaged by public disclosure that they are being
investigated for serious crimes. For this reason, in the absence
of any indictment, which would provide an opportunity for
such persons to defend their name, it is not proper to divulge
details of who may be under investigation by the Prosecutor.
The NATO air campaign, however, does not raise such
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The committee titled its report the "Final Report to the
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (ICTY Final
Report). The committee acknowledged that it had relied upon both the
Al and HRW reports, as well as "various documents submitted by
Human Rights Watch. 2 °6 In the ICTY Final Report, the committee
determined that based on the low number of civilian casualties in the
campaign (approximately 500 civilian deaths resulting from 38,400
sorties that released 23,614 air munitions), NATO did not conduct "a
campaign aimed at causing substantial civilian casualties. 2 °7 Moreover,
the committee concluded that generally, "in the particular incidents
reviewed by the committee, it is the view of the committee that NATO
was attempting to attack objects it perceived to be legitimate military
objectives. 20 8 The committee scrutinized the five incidents it viewed as
the most "problematic" in greater detail but ultimately concluded that
209none of them warranted further investigation.
Although the committee relied on the ICTY Statute's Article 3
offense of unlawful attack, the committee used the AP I proportionality
principle throughout the report to guide its analysis. 210  The report
demonstrates some of the issues that the ICC Prosecutor will confront if
he pursues a similar investigation. For example, the committee
acknowledged the inherent difficulty in applying the proportionality
balancing test:
The main problem with the principle of proportionality
is not whether or not it exists but what it means and how
it is to be applied. It is relatively simple to state that
there must be an acceptable relation between the
considerations and there has been much public debate about
the allegations. The Prosecutor considers that in this situation,
quite unforeseen when the Tribunal came into existence, she
should take the unusual step of making her reasoning public.
Id.
206 ICTY Final Report, supra note 179 at 1259. Moreover, in "attempting to
assess what happened on the ground, the committee relied upon the Human
Rights Watch Report entitled Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign." Id.
207 Id. at 1272.
208 Id. at 1273.
209 Id.
211 Id. at 1265.
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legitimate destructive effect and undesirable collateral
effects. For example, bombing a refugee camp is
obviously prohibited if its only military significance is
that people in the camp are knitting socks for soldiers.
Conversely, an air strike on an ammunition dump should
not be prohibited merely because a farmer is plowing a
field in the area. Unfortunately, most applications of the
principle of proportionality are not so clear cut. It is
much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality
in general terms than it is to apply it to a particular set of
circumstances because the comparison is often between
unlike quantities and values. One cannot easily assess
the value of innocent human lives as opposed to
211
capturing a particular military objective.
Moreover, the committee fully recognized that analyzing collateral
damage is not an easy process:
The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be
necessary to resolve them on a case by case basis, and
the answers may differ depending on the background of
the decision maker. It is unlikely that a human rights
lawyer and an experienced combat commander would
assign the same relative values to military advantage and
to injury to noncombatants. Further, it is unlikely that
military commanders with differing doctrinal
backgrounds and differing degrees of combat experience
would agree in close cases.
212
Perhaps as a response to the Al report, the Final Report pointed
out that simply establishing the fact that civilian deaths have occurred
does not unequivocally lead to the presumption that war crimes have
taken place and that there are numerous reasons why unintended civilian
deaths are not necessarily unlawful: "Much of the material submitted to
the OTP consisted of reports that civilians had been killed, often inviting
the conclusion to be drawn that crimes had therefore been committed.,
213
The committee report further explained that:
211 Id. at 1271.
212 Id.
213 id.
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Collateral casualties to civilians and collateral damage to
civilian objects can occur for a variety of reasons.
Despite an obligation to avoid locating military
objectives within or near densely populated areas, to
remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives,
and to protect civilians from the dangers of military
operations, very little prevention may be feasible in
many cases. 214
The five incidents the OTP committee scrutinized highlight some
of the common factual scenarios where collateral damage can occur.
Thus, they are worth reviewing in some detail as they depict the
operational setting that must always be considered when analyzing
collateral damage incidents. In one case, NATO air personnel attempted
to destroy a railway bridge used to supply Serb forces in Kosovo.215 The
committee could not determine whether the pilot or the weapons system
officer (WSO) controlled the release of the munitions aimed at the
bridge. A train appeared on the bridge when it was too late to direct the
laser guided bomb away from the train. Unfortunately, at least ten
civilians were killed.216 As the bomb did not destroy the bridge, either
the pilot or the WSO tried to reengage the bridge at a point away from
the train. Unexpectedly, the train "slid forward as a result of the original
impact and parts of the train were also hit by the second bomb.' 21 7
The committee found that the bridge constituted a valid military
objective and that the NATO personnel did not intentionally target the
train. The committee recognized the inherent operational difficulty for
both the pilot and the WSO:
Either person would have been traveling in a high speed
aircraft and likely performing several tasks
simultaneously, including endeavoring to keep the
aircraft in the air and safe from surrounding threats in a
combat environment.. .the person controlling the bombs
214 id.
215 Id. at 1273-75.
216Id. at 1273.
217 Id. at 1273-75.
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still had a very short period of time, less than 7 or 8
seconds in all probability to react.218
Although the committee was divided on "whether there was an element
of recklessness" regarding the second bomb, the committee
recommended no investigation by the ICTY OTP. 19
Two incidents dealt with collateral damage resulting from the
fog of war. In one case, NATO pilots mistakenly believed that a convoy
of civilian refugees contained Serbian military forces instead. 220 The
mistake arose from reports of Serb forces burning Kosovar Albanian
towns. 2 2 1  Following these reports, NATO pilots were sent to the
Djakovica area to attack the responsible Serb armed forces. NATO
forces dropped several bombs on what appeared to be Serbian military
222convoys. 2 However, the convoys were actually carrying civilian
refugees, and 70-75 people died from the attacks. 223 The NATO F-16
pilots stopped the attacks immediately after learning that the convoys
were civilian.224
While the committee determined that there was no intent to
attack the civilians and that the incident did not warrant an OTP
investigation, the report was somewhat critical of NATO's practice of
flying at 15,000 feet to evade Serb air defense artillery:
While there is nothing unlawful about operating at a
height above Yugoslav air defenses, it is difficult for any
aircrew operating an aircraft flying at several hundred
miles an hour and at a substantial height to distinguish
between military and civilian vehicles in a convoy. In
this case, most of the attacking aircraft were F-16s with
a crew of one person to fly the aircraft and identify the
target... [T]his incident is one where it appears the
aircrews could have benefited from lower altitude
scrutiny of the target at an early stage...225
218 Id. at 1274.
219 Id. at 1275.
2°Id. at 1275-77.
221 Id. at 1275.
222 Id. at 1275-76.
223 Id. at 1275.
224 Id. at 1276.
225 Id. at 1276-77.
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In another case, NATO pilots had military intelligence indicating
that Serb military forces were based in the village of Korisa. 226 Pilots
identified "military revetments" and recognizable profiles of military
vehicles during a night operation. However, civilians were also present,
and 87 people died as a result of the attacks.227  The committee did
acknowledge that "displaced Kosovar civilians were forcibly
concentrated within a military camp in the village of Korisa as human
shields and that the Yugoslav military forces may thus be at least
partially responsible for the deaths there. 228  Nonetheless, while the
committee recommended no OTP investigation, it did so partly out of a
belief that the "available information concerning this information is in
conflict.
229
Faulty intelligence was the cause of another collateral damage
incident. A NATO aircraft destroyed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
under the incorrect assumption that the embassy was actually the
Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement. 230 Due to the
226 Id. at 1281-82.
217 Id. at 1281.
2281 Id. at 1282.
229 Id.
230 CLARK, supra note 180, at 291. General Clark describes the targeting
analysis in this case:
[W]e received the completed target sheets for several more
targets, including the headquarters for the Federal Directorate
of Supply and Procurement in Belgrade. According to the
target sheet, this agency was responsible for the coordination
of arms trafficking. I looked at it and saw what looked like a
three- story building with long rows of warehouse-like
structures behind it. It was the same once-over I gave all the
targets in my review-I was principally checking the risks of
civilian casualties if we went ahead, and the proximity of any
other significant structures. Along with the targets, we also
maintained a comprehensive "no-strike" list, which we used to
avoid strikes that might damage churches, hospitals, schools,
embassies, and so forth. As I looked at this target, number
493, it seemed significant in isolating Serbia from arms
imports.
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clear mistaken identity of the target, the committee again recommended
no investigation by the OTP."'
Finally, the committee reviewed the targeting of a Serbian TV
and Radio Station (RTS) in Belgrade.232 NATO air forces attacked the
RTS building in an effort to break up the Serb command and control
system. The attack succeeded in destroying the RTS facilities, and ten to
seventeen people inside the building died in the attack.233
Here, the committee's analysis focused on the validity of the
RTS building as a military objective under Article 52 of AP I. There was
no disputing NATO's intent in targeting the building; rather, the question
was whether NATO was legally authorized in targeting the building in
the first place. The committee questioned the legitimacy of the RTS
building as a target. Specifically, the committee found that "if the attack
on the RTS was justified by reference to its propaganda purpose alone,
its legality might well be questioned by some experts in the field of
international humanitarian law. 234 As the committee also referred to
NATO perhaps having a more acceptable objective "of disabling the
Serbian military command and control system and to destroy the nerve
system and apparatus that keeps Milogevi6 in power," it did not make a
specific finding that the RTS was an illegitimate target.235 Even so, the
committee did not fully resolve the issue of whether the RTS was a valid
military objective as the committee ultimately stated, "Assuming the
station was a legitimate objective, the civilian casualties were
unfortunately high but do not appear to be clearly disproportionate"
(emphasis added).236 Consequently, the committee recommended no
investigation by the OTP.237
The committee's final recommendations were somewhat
ambivalent. Although the committee did not recommend OTP
investigation for any of the collateral damage incidents, the conclusion
was hardly a ringing endorsement of NATO's conduct:
NATO has admitted that mistakes did occur during the
bombing campaign; errors of judgment may also have
231 ICTY Report, supra note 179, at 1280-81.
232 Id. at 1277-80.
233 Id. at 1277.
234Id. at 1278.
235 id.
236 Id. at 1279.
237 Id. at 1277-80.
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occurred. Selection of certain objectives for attack may
be subject to legal debate. On the basis of the
information reviewed, however, the committee is of the
opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to
the bombing campaign as a whole nor investigations
related to specific incidents are justified. In all cases,
either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations
are unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient
evidence to substantiate charges against high level
accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous
offenses. 238
In the end, the U.S was not pleased with the outcome. The U.S.
government protested the investigation itself as a White House
spokesman stated, "NATO undertook extraordinary efforts to restrict
collateral damage .... Any inquiry into the conduct of its pilots would
be completely unjustified.2 39 Judith A. Miller, who served as General
Counsel for the Department of Defense during Operation Allied Force,
appreciated the committee report's conclusion. However, she believed
that:
[T]he manner in which the committee reached its
conclusions is deeply disturbing. To have twenty-twenty
hindsight scrutiny, done at leisure, of decisions and
determinations made in the fog of war, often under
instantaneous time constraints and life-threatening
conditions by military commanders, pilots, soldiers and
airmen, based on allegations by those who do not hold
Western nations in very high regard, is a chilling and
frightening prospect. I fear that the reservations of the
United States with respect to the International Criminal
Court are well-founded, based on the aftermath of the
Kosovo conflict. 
2 40
Similarly, Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, who served as the air
commander during OAF, commented on the Djakovica incident:
238 Id. at 1283.
239 Steven Lee Myers, Kosovo Inquiry Confirms U.S. Fears of War Crimes
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2000, at A6.240 Judith A. Miller, Commentary, 78 INT'L L. STUD. 107, 111-12 (2002).
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As for the convoy that we struck early in the operations
against the third army in Kosovo, I reviewed the tape
five times before it became clear to me that those were
indeed tractors hauling wagons as opposed to eighteen-
wheel military vehicles. The young man that dropped
those bombs was flying at 450 miles an hour in bad
weather and he was being shot at. He had one chance to
make identification and he made a mistake. That was
not a war crime. He had no intent to kill people he was
not supposed to kill. He made a mistake.2 4'
Finally, the NGO campaign against NATO had the effect of
essentially asserting a moral equivalency between NATO's acts with
Milo~evi6's Serbian forces' heinous attacks on civilians. NATO
Secretary General George Robertson responded by stating, "I regret that
NATO's action caused even a single civilian death, but these unintended
incidents in no way compare to the systematic, unspeakable violence
inflicted on civilians by Milosevic's troops and paramilitary forces."
242
B. Iraq
International law draws a clear distinction between civilians and
combatants. The principle that civilians must be protected lies at the
heart of [the] international law of armed conflict.-U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld
243
After efforts to force Iraq to comply with numerous U.N.
Security Resolutions proved to be unsuccessful, U.S. and coalition
partners began Operation Iraqi Freedom (OI1) on March 19, 2003.244 A
241 Short, supra note 189, at 21.
242 SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 463 (2002).
243 DoD Background Briefing on Targeting, supra note 84.
244 See President Bush's statements from March 17 and 19, 2003, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005) and at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005). For a legal justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom, see
William H. Taft IV and Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq and International
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campaign of only 22 days succeeded in ending Saddam Hussein's regime
and occupying all of Iraq's territory 45
Just as in the Kosovo campaign, the U.S. and its coalition
partners went to extraordinary lengths to minimize collateral damage
during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). A careful and thorough review of
targets, improvements in technology, restrictions on target approval in
cases potentially involving significant collateral damage, and full
participation by military lawyers in the planning and operational phases
of the campaign all contributed to a strong effort to reduce and minimize
collateral damage.
Shortly before the war began, the U.S. Department of Defense
presented an extensive background briefing on the planning measures
taken to attack "legitimate military targets while sparing no effort to
protect innocent civilians.2 46 The briefing described the targeting
process that would be used in OIF. Military planners would identify
military targets, choose aim points on the target in computer simulation
models, and then assess the potential collateral damage.247  If the
potential collateral damage appeared to be high, the planner would take
steps to mitigate and reduce collateral damage.248 For example, smaller
weapons could be used or the fusing of the munitions could be changed.
The aim point or azimuth could be adjusted to lessen the impact on the
target. The time of the attack could be selected to minimize collateral
damage. Attacks could occur at night so civilian non-combatants would
not be present, particularly with dual use facilities - legitimate military
targets with a civilian function. Moreover, "early warning" through the
use of different forms of communication to the civilian population was
another means to reduce collateral damage. Finally, "no strike lists"
were prepared to ensure Coalition forces did not target protected
facilities such as mosques, hospitals, and schools.
2 49
Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 557 (2003). See more generally Agora: Future
Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 553-642 (2003) for a
collection of articles outlining the legal arguments for and against Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
245 John Keegan, Brilliant Coalition Operation To Topple the Regime, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 19, 2004, at 14.
246 DoD Background Briefing on Targeting, supra note 84.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
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Technology improvements further enhanced efforts to minimize
collateral damage. The use of precision guided munitions substantially
increased from Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. 250 A Department of
Defense official predicted that close to 90% of the munitions used in
situations where potential collateral damage would be a significant
concern would be precision guided munitions. 25  The development of
the Predator, an unmanned aircraft, helped supply more accurate
intelligence by providing live video footage that could show how many
civilian non-combatants were near a particular military target.252 A new
computer program, the FAST-CD, Fast Assessment Strike Tool -
Collateral Damage, also known more informally as "bugsplat," made a
more sophisticated and precise estimate of the potential collateral
253damage associated with a given target. The program was viewed as a
"significant advance" in analyzing potential collateral damage. 54
250 Nick Cook, Effect-Based Air Operations- Cause and Effect, JANE'S DEF.
WKLY., June 17, 2003. ("During 'Desert Storm,' 7.7% of weapons dropped
were precision munitions. In Operation 'Allied Force' against Serbia in 1999 it
was 40%. During Operation 'Enduring Freedom' the figure rose again to
60.4%. In 'Iraqi Freedom,' official statistics will show an even higher level of
PGMs dropped.").
251 DoD Background Briefing on Targeting, supra note 84.
252 Tom Bowman, U.S. Aims to Curtail Civilian Casualties; Minimizing Such
Harm Part of Plans for Iraq War, BALT. SUN, Mar. 5, 2003, at 1A. The
program's unofficial name was derived from the impression it projected on the
computer screen, which resembled that of a bug hitting a windshield.
253 Bradley Graham, Military Turns To Software To Cut Civilian Casualties,
WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2003, at A18.
254 Id. (quoting Brigadier General Kelvin R. Coppock, director of intelligence
for the Air Combat Command). The article noted:
As outlined by officials here, the targeting process
normally begins as senior commanders translate the overall
goals of the president and secretary of defense into military
objectives. Weaponeering teams then designate viable targets,
drawing on vast, detailed descriptions of enemy facilities
stored in the MIDB: the Modernized Integrated Data Base.
Eventually, agreement is reached on a master attack lane,
which is parceled into daily air tasking orders that assign
specific targets to specific aircraft.
Collateral damage assessments come into play when
the attack plan is being drawn up. Each potential target is
examined for proximity to civilians or civilian property, which
is where Bugsplat is intended to help. To lessen potential
VOL. 13
THE ICC PROSECUTOR
In OIF, Secretary Rumsfeld reserved the authority to approve
individual attacks that could result in 30 or more unintended civilian
casualties.2 55 Moreover, on numerous occasions U.S. pilots had to obtain
permission from the Central Command Commander, General Tommy
Franks, in other cases potentially involving less collateral damage. Even
though many of these targets were of significant military value, up to one
quarter of them were cancelled by General Franks or his subordinates at
the Combined Air Operations Center.25 6
collateral damage, targeting specialists can try substituting a
smaller weapon or one with a delayed fuse that lets a bomb
penetrate first and then detonate. Changing the type of aircraft
and its angle of attack can make a difference ....
255 Bradley Graham, U.S. Moved Early for Air Supremacy, Airstrikes on Iraqi
Defenses Began Long Before Invasion, General Says, WASH. POST, July 20,
2003, at A26. Lt. Gen. T. Michael "Buzz" Moseley "revealed that the decision
to bomb targets in Iraq that military planners had estimated could result in the
deaths of 30 or more noncombatants had been reserved for Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld. About 40 or 50 targets fell in this category, including
broadcast facilities in Baghdad and some government ministry buildings." Id.
During the war, Lt. Gen. Mosely, who served as the Combined Air Component
Commander, stressed the importance of minimizing collateral damage: "At the
core of Mosely's planning [was] a firm commitment to avoiding loss of innocent
lives. 'We are taking extraordinary measures to prevent noncombatant
casualties,"' said Mosely. Douglas H. Stutz, CFACC Provides Guidance for
Coalition Air Campaign, Apr. 15 2003, at
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storylD=41503985 (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
Lt. Gen. Mosley also stated:
With our ability to control the skies, we use our command and
control system to assess every proposed action and we conduct
all operations with great discipline and proportionality. We
know that Saddam has positioned his air defenses around
Baghdad near hospitals, schools, and mosques . . . . That
makes it very complicated, because we are very disciplined
and proportional about the application of force and we take
collateral damage and the needless loss of life or putting
civilians at risk very seriously. It will be a definite challenge,
but we are certainly up to the task.
Id.
256 See Richard J. Newman, Not By The Playbook, How the war plan deviates
from traditional doctrine, US NEWS & WORLD REP. Apr. 7, 2003, at 27. He
writes:
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Just as in OAF, during OIF military lawyers were closely
involved with legal issues associated with the planning for and executing
of the war in order to ensure compliance with the laws of war. Before
the war, Central Command judge advocates provided legal reviews for
the preparation of the overall operational plan and the targeting plan, as
well as the OIF rules of engagement. 257 During the war, judge advocates
But there have been many sorties-often involving "high
value" targets-in which the pilot must radio back to the
combined air operations center, or CAOC, in Saudi Arabia for
permission to launch attacks that could cause "collateral
damage" to buildings or civilians. In some of those cases the
risk is so high that the Central Command chief, Gen. Tommy
Franks, must make the call. The result? About a quarter of
the strikes referred back to the CAOC have been scrapped.
U.S. officials say that shows how determined Franks and his
staff are to protect Iraqi civilians.
See also Eric Schmitt, A Nation At War, Civilians.- Rumsfeld Says Important
Targets Have Been Avoided, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2003, §B, 12, who also
writes:
Senior American commanders have avoided bombing
as many as three dozen high-priority Iraqi targets for fear of
civilian casualties, making it harder to achieve some of the air
campaign's important goals, military officials said today.
These targets, mostly in Baghdad, include the Iraqi
Ministry of Defense, television and communications facilities
that allow the Iraqi regime to stay on the airwaves, and the
Rashid Hotel, which American intelligence analysts say has a
secret underground communications bunker, the officials said.
257 Captain M. Scott Holcomb, View from the Legal Frontlines, 4 CHI J. INT'L L.
561, 564-68 (2003). Captain Holcomb served as an Army judge advocate with
the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFFLC) in Camp Doha,
Kuwait during OIF. He observed that during the planning for OIF it was
envisioned that
Coalition forces would seek to prevent as much collateral
damage as possible to minimize the loss of life and preserve
critical infrastructure that would be needed to distribute
humanitarian aid and jump-start the post-regime government
and economy. . . . It is unlikely that military planners have
ever dedicated as much time, thought, and energy to winning a
war while causing the absolute minimal amount of damage to
the enemy, including their army, as coalition forces did during
OIF.
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at all levels of command advised commanders on targeting issues. 258 An
ABC news release provides an illustrative example of how U.S. Army
judge advocates in Iraq provided legal advice on targeting issues, in an
effort to avoid collateral damage:
When the 3Pd Infantry Division was facing artillery fire
from the direction of a school soccer field in southern
Id. at 564. Captain Holcomb and his colleagues reviewed the campaign
targeting plan early in the process:
We wanted to ensure that the target nominations were
consistent with the campaign plan as well as with the law of
war. We reviewed the targets with an eye towards preserving
infrastructure, especially the bridges and roads that, while
potentially valid military targets, would be vital to the delivery
of humanitarian assistance goods to the Iraqi people.
Id. at 568. Moreover, Captain Holcomb and his colleagues played a significant
role in the drafting and implementation of rules of engagement for OIF:
[T]he ROE for OIF were the result of months of an inclusive
process of collaboration, refinement, and testing. . . . In a
deliberate, thorough process, CENTCOM sought and accepted
input from subordinate commands to ensure that the ROE
accomplished the commander's intent to defeat the enemy
while preserving critical infrastructure. The ROE were then
tested and validated during numerous exercises from
November 2002 until February 2003. Once the ROE were
approved, attorneys took the lead on preparing training briefs
and ROE pocket cards that serve as a reference and training
aid for soldiers in the field.
Id. at 565.
258 Id. at 568.
During combat operations, attorneys reviewed targets at all
command levels on the battlefield. At CFLCC, we reviewed
every pre-planned strike and time-sensitive target, and we
never had to raise an objection regarding a target's legitimacy.
We did, however, raise numerous concerns about collateral
damage, and some targets were removed from the nomination
list. The judge advocate's role is to provide advice, but the
commander makes the decision. The commander must
determine if a strike is proportional, which requires that the
anticipated loss of life and damage incidental to the attacks is
not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage expected to be gained.
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Iraq, Col. Lyle Cayce had to make a quick battlefield
decision- not a military one, but a legal one. Cayce and
16 others... are Army lawyers tasked with sorting
through the rules and regulations of war to make sure
they're properly carried out on the battlefield.
"Under international law, the rules are very simple,"
Cayce told ABCNEWS' [Ted] Koppel. "A school is a
protected place. But by placing the artillery piece in the
school or next to the school ... the enemy has kind of
taken away the protected status of that place."
After analyzing the situation and deciding what
kind of weapon might cause the least collateral damage,
Cayce gave his assessment to the 3 rd Infantry
commanders. The commanders then called upon the Air
Force, which used a precision-guided missile to take out
the artillery, while minimizing damage to the school.25 9
Inevitably, though, in a campaign of the magnitude of OF,
unintended civilian casualties occurred. Estimates varied as to how
many of the casualties were the result of coalition operations.26 ° Part of
the problem was determining how many Iraqi deaths were Iraqi soldiers
or how many Iraqi deaths were attributable to Iraqi military actions, i.e.
collateral damage resulting from Iraqi operations. Iraqi violations of the
laws of war may also have contributed to the total.2 6
259 Ted Koppel & Amanda Onion, Fighting by the Rules, The Conventions of
Conflict Require Careful Military Planning, Mar. 28, 2003 at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/Primetime/iraq_rulesofwar030328.html
(last visited Oct. 5, 2004) (on file with Review).
260 Laura King, Baghdad's Death Toll Assessed, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at
1; Niko Price, Civilian Death Toll 3,240 in Iraq War, DESERT MORNING NEWS
(Salt Lake City), June 11, 2003, at Al.
261 Koppel & Onion, supra note 259. See also Max Boot, The New American
Way of War, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2003, at 41.
Saddam's regime sought to take advantage of U.S.
sensitivities by locating military installations among schools,
hospitals, and mosques. But even with such dire provocations,
U.S. forces still took great care to spare civilians.... Ground
forces also did their best to avoid killing civilians, even though
Saddam's thugs used human shields in blatant violation of the
laws of war. Even though U.S. Army doctrine favors
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While some human rights NGO representatives critiqued the
coalition's adherence to the laws of war in measured tones, if not praise,
other NGOs viewed the unintended casualties and collateral damage as
war crimes and demanded action.262 For example, an international
coalition of NGOs served notice on both President Bush and United
Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair that they would be investigated and
possibly prosecuted for war crimes. This notice occurred nearly two
nighttime operations, the 101st Airborne Division operated
mainly during the daytime-because, as one of its brigade
commanders put it, "You can much more easily discern
civilians during the daytime." No one knows how many
civilians were killed in the second Gulf War, but even
Saddam's regime, which had an obvious interest in
exaggerating the figures, claimed the total was no more than
1,254 as of April 3-a remarkably low number considering
the savagery of the fighting.
Id. at 53.
262 King, supra note 260. William Arkin, an HRW military consultant in 2000-
2001, said, "'If the worst single incident of civilian collateral damage in this war
from airstrikes is the market bombing (in Baghdad), where 50 or so civilians
died, you can get a sense of the advancement that has occurred as a result of a
greater percentage of precision-guided weapons being used by air forces."' Id.
(quoting Arkin). "'I think it is more than just rhetoric this time,' said Steve
Goose, director of the arms division of Human Rights Watch, which has been
critical of military offenses around the world for a perceived callousness toward
civilians. 'The strides in technology and the increased sensitivity to avoiding
civilian casualties have been great."' Steve Miller, Surgical Strikes Designed to
Reduce Casualties, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at A4. HRW's report on the
Iraqi conflict acknowledged Iraqi violations of the laws of war and the steps the
United States took to prevent civilian casualties: "The investigation showed that
Iraqi forces committed a number of violations international humanitarian law,
which may have led to significant civilian casualties. . . .U.S.-led Coalition
forces took precautions to spare civilians, and for the most part, made efforts to
uphold their legal obligations." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ (2003), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/3.htm#_Toc57442227 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2005). While the report was critical of some U.S. practices, it did not
recommend any sort of war crimes prosecutions for U.S. forces.
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months before the war started and stressed using collateral damage as the
basis for a war crimes charge.263
One of this NGO movement's leaders compared coalition leaders
to Slobodan Milogevi6 if they did not "ensure that all force used [would
be] targeted, discriminate, proportionate and necessary,"2 64 while another
accused coalition governments of "planning to commit nothing short of
mass murder. 2 65
263 See Press Release, The Center for Constitutional Rights, Law Professors and
NGO's Warn President Bush of Legal Consequences of Iraq War (Jan. 24, 2002)
at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/newsroon/releases/pReleases.asp?ObjID
=Jrk3y3IFCi&Content=179 (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). The letter discussed the
possibility of using collateral damage as the basis for war crimes charges and
concluded:
Accordingly, we are committed to ensuring the accountability
of those persons found responsible for such crimes against
humanity and war crimes in this war. To this end, together
with non-governmental organizations here in the U.S. and the
U.K., we will seek to pursue prosecutions of persons
responsible for such crimes with the Prosecutor to ICC, where
they are nationals of state party to the statute. For non-party
states, like the U.S., we will petition the Security Council to
refer the matter to the Prosecutor under the Statute of the ICC
and actively pursue all other avenues of bringing them to
account.
Letter from the Center for Constitutional Rights to George Bush, President of
the Untied States, and Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Jan. 24, 2002),
available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/newsroom/docs/letter togeorgebush.pdf
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005). The CCR web site also includes much anti-Iraq war
information. See http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/home.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
264 Press Release, Public Interest Lawyers, Blair, Hoon and Straw to be
investigated for War Crimes! (Jan. 23, 2003), at
http://www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk/legaldocs/WCPRESSRELEASE23.1.03.
doc (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (quoting Phil Shiner, an attorney with the NGO
Public Interest Lawyers, as saying, "The UK Government must ensure that all
force used is targeted, discriminate, proportionate and necessary, otherwise its
leaders face a similar fate to that of Milosovic [sic].").
265 Id. (quoting Michael Mandel of the NGO Lawyers Against the War
(Canada). The quote of Michael Mandel, in its entirety, reads:
Our governments are planning to commit nothing short of
mass murder. They are planning to kill Iraqi civilians without
any lawful justification or excuse. That's a crime in England
and in Canada and under international law. No one is above
the law, not even Prime Ministers. If they do this terrible
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However, it was Jan Fermon, a Belgian attorney, with the NGO
"Stop USA Coalition- Stop the United States of Aggression" (StopUSA),
who successfully filed charges of alleged US war crimes in OIF with a
national court in Belgium. StopUSA's own literature indicates that the
NGO was formed in September 2002 "to prepare the mobilization
against the war in Iraq. 266 The NGO also "aims at global war politics of
the US" so the NGO desired to continue its protest activities beyond the
war. 267 StopUSA viewed the war crimes charge against OIF Commander
U.S. General Tommy Franks as a means to continue its protest against
the war, to create more regional and international support for its NGO,
and to serve as a fundraiser for the NGO.268
thing, we are going to see to it they are personally brought to
justice. We are going to prosecute each and every one of them
for each and every crime they commit.
266 Complaint Against General Franks, NEWSL. (Stop USA, Belgium), June
2003, at
http://www.stopusa.be/franks/franks.php?theme=Telex&langue=3&Id=22299
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
267 Id. ("In Belgium the coordination STOP USA unites dozens of organizations
on an anti-imperialist platform ....").
268 Id. Stop USA's June 2003 newsletter, Complaint against General Franks,
states:
Dozens of millions of people have been demonstrating against
this war. Current action is a way of continuing that struggle,
to fight against impunity, and to prepare for a broader
movement, which is better capable of resisting against future
wars ....
Also it seems necessary to us to organise [sic] on a
European level a coordination of all powers, groups,
committees and fronts of anti-imperialist inspiration within the
peace movement... Current action against Franks is a good
starting point and an instrument which can be used by
committees and groups with various inspiration. It can be of
great use for the development of a such [sic] movement,
together and on an international scale.
Id. In a subsequent newsletter, Stop USA spoke of its "intensive campaign to
collect financial support" and provided bank account information for more
contributions, even after the case had been dismissed. Newsletter 2, NEWSL.
(Stop USA, Belgium), at
http://www.stopusa.be/franks/franks.php?theme=Telex&langue=3&Id=22301
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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A review of the history of the Belgian law is necessary to place
the Stop USA/Fermon allegations in context. In 1993, Belgium amended
its national criminal code to allow its courts to prosecute violations of the
1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols I and II no matter
where the violations occurred.2 69 In 1999, at the urging of human rights
NGOs, Belgium further amended the law to authorize prosecutions for
crimes against humanity and genocide. 270 The law, formally known as
the Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International
Humanitarian Law, provides: "The Belgian courts shall be competent to
deal with breaches provided in the present Act, irrespective of where
such breaches have been committed.,,27' As the Act incorporated AP I, it
contained a provision covering collateral damage incidents:
The grave breaches listed below . . . constitute crimes
under international law and be punishable in accordance
with the provisions of the present Act:
-launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian
population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such
attack will cause loss of human life, injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated, without prejudice to the criminal nature of
the attack whose harmful effects, even where
proportionate to the military advantage anticipated,
269 Anthony Sammons, The "Under-Theorization" of Universal Jurisdiction:
Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21
BERKELEY J. INT'LL. 111, 113 (2003).
270 Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 888, 889 (2003).
271 Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, Introduction to Belgium: Act
Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian
Law, 38 I.L.M. 918, 924 (1999). The Belgian act was so sweeping that it
authorized prosecution of the specified crimes "regardless of the place of the
commission of the crime, the presence of the perpetrator on Belgian territory,
the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim or the time the crime was
committed." See Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, Belgian Law
Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian
Law: A Contested Law with Uncontested Objectives, ASIL INSIGHTS, July
2003, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl12.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
Moreover, under the Belgian law, the claimant "did not have to be a Belgian
national or reside in Belgium." Id.
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would be inconsistent with the principles of international
law derived from established custom, from the principles
of humanity and from the dictates of public
272conscience.
Human rights NGOs extolled the Act.273 Given the Act's far-
reaching universal jurisdiction, numerous claims were filed against
acting heads of state around the world alleging various violations.274
Altogether, over forty separate allegations were made, yet only one case
was successfully prosecuted. 75
However, in response to an adverse opinion from the
International Court of Justice on the legality of prosecuting an acting
foreign minister,276 and amidst growing concerns over the politicization
272 Smis & Van der Borght, Introduction to Belgium: Act Concerning the
Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, supra note
271, at 922.
273 Smis & Van der Borght, Belgian Law Concerning the Punishment of Grave
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law: A Contested Law with
Uncontested Objectives, supra note 271.
271 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Anti-Atrocity Law Limited,
But Case Against ex-Chad Dictator Can Move Forward (Apr. 5 2003), at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/belgium040503.htm (last visited Mar. 1,
2005). The press release lists the following heads of state:
Mauritanian President Maaouya ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon, Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo, Rwandan
President Pal Kagame, Cuban President Fidel Castro, Central
African Republic President Ange-Felix Patasse, Pebulic of
Congo President, Denis Sasou Nguesso, Palestinian Authority
President Yassir Arafat, former Chadian President Hissene
Habre, former Chilean President Gen. Augusto Pinochet,
former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani, former
Moroccan interior minister Driss Basri, [and] former Foreign
Minister Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo ....
275 Smis & Van der Borght, Belgian Law Concerning the Punishment of Grave
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law. A Contested Law with
Uncontested Objectives, supra note 271.
276 Stefan Smis & Kim Van Der Borght, Introductory Note to Belgium's
Amendment to the Law of June 16, 1993 (As amended by the law of February
10, 1999) Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of Humanitarian Law,
42 I.L.M. 740, 743 (2003). The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
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277
of the Act, the Belgian government modified the Act's provisions.
Under an April 23, 2003 amendment, the Act retained universal
jurisdiction, but it required the allegations to be furnished to the federal
prosecutor for disposition if the allegations contained no ties or
connections to Belgium. 278 If the claims had no nexus to Belgium, then
279the prosecutor had the discretion to pursue the case.
challenged a Belgian arrest warrant issued against the acting DRC Minister of
Foreign Affairs. The DRC asked the International Court of Justice to review the
case. The ICJ found that the Belgian act impermissibly contravened diplomatic
immunity. See Sammons, supra note 269, at 141-42. See also Mark Summers,
The International Court of Justice's Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How has it
affected the development of a principle of universal jurisdiction that would
obligate all states to prosecute war criminals?, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 63 (2003).
277 Smis & Van der Borght, supra note 276 at 744.
278 Belgium's Amendment to the law of June 15, 1993 (as amended by the law of
February 10, 1999) Concerning the punishment of grave breaches of
humanitarian law, 42 I.L.M. 749, 755 (2003).
279 See Article 5 of the amendment, amending Article 7, Section 1 to read as
follows:
Article 7 §1: Except in the event of abstention from
jurisdiction as provide in one of the situations set forth in the
following paragraphs, Belgian courts shall have jurisdiction
over the violations provided by the present law, independently
of where they have been committed and even if the alleged
offender is not located within Belgium.
The criminal action will nonetheless be subject to the request
of the federal prosecutor if:
1. the violation was not committed on Belgian
territory
2. the alleged offender is not Belgian
3. the alleged offender is not located within Belgian
territory
4. the victim is not Belgian or has not resided in
Belgium for at least three years
Once seized with an application under paragraph 2, the federal
prosecutor will request that the magistrate judge investigate
the complaint unless:
1. the complaint is manifestly unfounded; or
2. the facts presented do not correspond to a
definition of an offense under the present law; or
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A spokesperson for the Belgian Foreign Minister viewed the amendment
as "a good thing for diplomatic relations .... The law was originally
passed based on good intentions but was abused for political reasons.,,
210
Nevertheless, while the Belgian government was moving to
amend the law, and on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Raymond
Coumont, president of another antiwar NGO, Meeting for Peace, filed
another complaint in Belgium against former President George Herbert
Walker Bush, former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and retired General
H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. forces during the 1990-
1991 Gulf War.28 ' The complaint alleged war crimes for a bombing
during the first Gulf War that resulted in civilian casualties.282  Mr.
Coumont, speaking on behalf of the Iraqi civilians whom he filed the
claim with, stated:
The objective of the Iraqi families, who together lost
four or five children in that bombing, was to bring up the
question of responsibility for their losses ....
3. a criminal action cannot proceed under this
application; or
4. in the concrete circumstances of the matter, it
results that, in the interest of administration of
justice and in respect of Belgium's international
obligations, this matter should be brought either
before international tribunals, or before a tribunal
in the place where the acts were committed, or
before the tribunals of a State in which the
offender is a national or where he may be found,
and as long as this tribunal is competent,
independent, impartial and fair.
Id. at 755-56 (unofficial English translation).
280 Malvina Halberstam, Belgium's Universal jurisdiction law: vindication of
international justice or pursuit of politics?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 251-52
(2003).
281 Richard Bernstein, Belgium Rethinks its Prosecutorial Zeal, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2003, at A8. Mr. Coumont's antiwar NGO movement credentials are
also evidenced by his name appearing on an "International Peace Appeal"
posted on the Stop USA internet site. See Stop USA, International Peace
Appeal, at http://www.irak.be/ned/kalender/signatoriesIPA.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2005).
282 Bernstein, supra note 281, at A8.
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They also knew from their own experience that it is
simply not true that precision weapons prevent civilian
deaths .... And when they learned that President Bush
had decided to go to war against Iraq, they felt that it
was the moment to present their case.283
The clear political motivation behind filing a complaint for
alleged war crimes (occurring twelve years earlier) in the first Gulf War
days before the start of another war involving Iraq seemed to be the final
impetus for the Belgian government. Didier Seeuws, a spokesperson for
the Belgian Foreign Ministry stated, "This case proved that there is
something wrong with the genocide law. The government wants to
change the law.,
2 84
Consequently, the Belgian government was not pleased when
Jan Fermon filed his complaint against General Tommy Franks on May
14, 2003. 2" The complaint focused on civilian deaths resulting from
OIF operations, and charged they were war crimes under the Belgian
law's version of AP I's prohibition on indiscriminate attacks.286 The
Belgian government, acting under the new amendments, forwarded the
complaint to the U.S.287 This move did not entirely satisfy the U.S.
288
283 Id.
284 id.
285 Philippe Siuberski, US Iraq commander accused of war crimes in Belgium,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, May 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2802632 ("'It's an
abuse of the law,' Foreign Minister Louis Michel said, according to his
spokesman. 'The United States is a democracy and I don't see why this lawsuit
has not been introduced in that country,' Michel said. 'Belgium has no
pretensions to judge the United States.').
286 Complaint filed against General Tommy Franks et al., available at
http://www.stopusa.be/franks/plainteen.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). Mr.
Fermon filed the charges against General Franks in light of the International
Court of Justice opinion discussed above. See Jeffrey T. Kuhner, Iraqis Target
Gen. Franks for War Crimes Trial in Belgium, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at
Al, available at 2003 WL7710253 ("Mr. Fermon said that because under
international law President Bush and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell cannot
be prosecuted for war crimes while they are in office, the complaint will target
Gen. Franks and other U.S. military officials.").
287 US offers only faint praise for Belgian move on Franks lawsuit, AGENCE FR.
PRESSE, May 21, 2003.
288 Id.
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The matter came to a head at a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels,
Belgium. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld strongly
emphasized the U.S. concerns about the two pending Belgian cases
against U.S. personnel:
The suits are absurd. Indeed, I would submit that there
is no general in history who has gone to greater lengths
than General Franks and his superb team to avoid
civilian casualties. I am told that the suit against
General Franks was effectively invited by a Belgian law
that claims to give Belgian courts powers to try the
citizens of any nation for war crimes. The United States
rejects the presumed authority of Belgian courts to try
General Franks, Colonel McCoy, Vice President
Cheney, Secretary Powell and General Schwarzkopf, as
well as former President Bush.
I will leave it to the lawyers to debate the legalities. I
am not a lawyer. But the point is this. By passing this
law, Belgium has turned its legal system into a platform
for divisive, politicized lawsuits against her NATO
allies.289
Moreover, Secretary Rumsfeld warned the Belgian government about the
consequences of the law: the ongoing criminal actions, and the potential
The United States on Wednesday expressed little
satisfaction with the Belgian government's decision to pass on
a lawsuit accusing the US military commander in Iraq of war
crimes.
The State Department said the move, an attempt by
Brussels to quash the suit, was positive but stressed
Washington would not be happy until the law under which the
case was filed was radically altered or eliminated.
Id.
289 U.S. Dep't of Defense, News Transcript: Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld at
NATO Headquarters (June 12, 2003), at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030612-secdefo271 .htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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for future criminal actions, against U.S. officials in the Belgium legal
system threatened the viability of Belgium as a NATO host. Along those
lines, Secretary Rumsfeld announced that the U.S. would suspend the
funding of a new NATO headquarters building.
290
In the midst of this controversy, the Belgian government
forwarded three new sets of war crimes complaints filed against U.S.
officials for alleged war crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq.2 9 In an effort to
finally resolve the matter, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt
quickly announced the government's intent to further restrict the Act and
end the "systematic abuse by people and organizations with a political
290 Id. Secretary Rumsfeld stated:
Belgium needs to realize that there are consequences to its
actions. This law calls into serious question whether NATO
can continue to hold meetings in Belgium and whether senior
U.S. officials, military and civilian, will be able to continue to
visit international organizations in Belgium....
If the civilian and military leaders of member states
can not come to Belgium without fear of harassment by
Belgian courts entertaining spurious charges by politicized
prosecutors, then it calls into question Belgium's attitude
about its responsibilities as a host nation for NATO and Allied
forces .... Certainly until this matter is resolved we will have
to oppose any further spending for construction for a new
NATO headquarters here in Brussels until we know with
certainty that Belgium intends to be a hospitable place for
NATO to conduct its business, as it has been over so many
years.
Id. This suspended $350 million in U.S. funds authorized for the
NATO headquarters. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Belgium Restricts War
Crimes Law, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 24, 2003, at 14,
available at 2003 WL 57777169.
291 Paul Ames, Belgium Rejects War Crime Claim vs. Bush, Associated Press,
June 19, 2003, at 2003 WL 57822891. Belgian officials stated that "the
complaints were filed separately by disgruntled people from Germany,
Switzerland and Belgium and concerned the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan." Id.
Three complaints were filed, one against President Bush, Prime Minister Blair,
Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and General Franks for Iraq allegations,
one against only Secretary Powell, and a third against President Bush, Secretary
Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ashcroft, National Security Advisor
Condoleeza Rice, and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz for allegations
from Iraq and Afghanistan. Id.
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agenda ' 292 and a "manifestly abusive political use" of the Act.293 The
new amendments strictly limited jurisdiction under the Act for crimes
occurring beyond Belgium's borders to those where either the victim or
defendant is a Belgian citizen or resident.294 After the changes, all
pending cases against U.S officials or former officials were ultimately
dismissed. 295
HRW advocacy director Reed Brody, who had constantly
encouraged other NGOs to use the Belgian law more judiciously,
summarized the Act's downfall: "People who really needed this law
shuddered as one high profile case after another was launched .... The
law was abused. The case against Franks was brought by antiwar people
looking to make a statement. 296
VI. Analysis
What can the ICC Prosecutor learn from the Kosovo and
Iraq/Belgium case studies? These case studies show that NGOs will look
for prosecutorial/judicial forums to make their cases against U.S. senior
civilian or military personnel. The case studies also provide examples of
the different approaches the ICC Prosecutor can take in addressing future
claims of collateral damage as a war crime. After reviewing how NGOs
can use the Rome Statute provisions to present their claims to the ICC,
this section analyzes the two different approaches, exemplified in the
case studies, that the ICC Prosecutor may chose to take or not take in
response to NGO allegations of collateral damage as a war crime.
To begin, NGOs will have the ability under RS Article 15 to
submit information to the Prosecutor for him or her to assess if there is a
"reasonable basis to proceed. 297 While this is very similar to Article
292 Raf Casert, New Belgian Government Pledges More Amendments War
Crimes Legislation, Associated Press Newswires, July 8, 2003 (quoting a
Belgian government statement).
293 Ratner, supra 270, at 891.
294 Id.
295 Raf Casert, Belgian court dismisses charges of US war crimes, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 25, 2003. See also Belgian Court Throws Out War Crimes Case
Against US General Franks, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 23, 2003, available at
2003 WL 71320955; Constant Brand, War Crimes Complaint Against Franks
Tossed, MIAMi HERALD, Jan. 14, 2004 (referring to the Belgian High Court
affirming a lower court's dismissals of General Franks' case and other cases).
296 Lynda Hurst, Belgium Reins in War-crime Law, TORONTO STAR, June 29,
2003, at F04 (quoting Reed Brody).
297 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 15.
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18(1) of the ICTY Statute, the potential influence of the NGOs will be
even greater in the ICC due to the differences between the missions of
the two courts. For example, the ICTY's mandate was limited to a
discrete geographical area and, as a practical matter, the ICTY could not
possibly pursue every atrocity that occurred in the Former Yugoslavia.298
Conversely, the ICC Prosecutor has a worldwide portfolio. In this sense,
it resembles the Belgian Act in its early stages where any NGO could
submit a claim.
Given the significant influence exerted by NGOs in lobbying for
an independent ICC Prosecutor, it stands to reason that NGOs will seek
to influence the Prosecutor's case selection through RS Article 15(2).299
If a sufficiently high number of civilian casualties result as collateral
damage in a future U.S. military operation, NGOs may submit this
information to the Prosecutor in the same manner that similar reports
were submitted to the OTP alleging NATO war crimes in Kosovo and to
the Belgian prosecutor alleging U.S. war crimes in Iraq. Indeed, the Jan
Fermon/StopUSA movement originally wanted to file their complaint
with the ICC, but they could not, as the U.S. is not an ICC member.3 °°
Moreover, notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction, the ICC Prosecutor
has already received a number of complaints alleging U.S. war crimes in
Iraq.3 'O Consequently, the ICC Prosecutor will have to make some early
298 RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 16, at 199.
299 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 15(2) (permitting the ICC Prosecutor to
"seek additional information from ... non-governmental organizations...").
300 Kuhner, supra note 286 ("The plaintiffs sought to file the complaint with the
recently inaugurated ICC, but 'since the United States did not ratify the treaty to
join the institution, [the plaintiffs] felt compelled to go to a court in Belgium'...
.'1).
301 See Court Rejects Anti-U.S. Petitions, WASH. TIMES, July 17, 2003. The
article reported that
The new International Criminal Court yesterday
rejected more than 100 requests to investigate complaints
about the U.S. led war in Iraq, saying it had no jurisdiction to
act on these claims.
"We have received communications about acts
allegedly perpetrated by U.S. troops in Iraq but we are not
mandated to prosecute such acts since neither Iraq nor the
United States is a state party to the court," ICC Chief
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said.
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policy decisions regarding how he or she intends to handle these types of
cases.
The ICC Prosecutor, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, should therefore
carefully consider the implications of the Kosovo report and the Belgian
cases. Unfortunately but inevitably, the issue of civilian collateral
damage in a military operation will arise again. The ICC Prosecutor will
need to decide how to respond. Based on the two case studies evaluated
above, two paths come to mind. The ICC Prosecutor could use the
occurrence of collateral damage to test his powers and fully investigate
under RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv). This course of action resembles the
Belgian scenario. Alternatively, as in the Kosovo case, the ICC
Prosecutor could also make a reasoned judgment to refrain from
investigating alleged violations under RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv). Let us
review how these two paths could unfold under the Rome Statute.
If the ICC Prosecutor wanted to fully test his powers in a
collateral damage scenario, the Prosecutor could first pursue an
investigation under RS Article 15(1) and gather information from
friendly NGOs under RS Article 15(2).302 Emulating the NGOs in the
Kosovo and Belgian complaints, the Prosecutor could make the argument
that a certain number of civilian deaths resulting from collateral damage
incidents is, by itself, enough to establish a "reasonable basis" to
proceed. The Prosecutor could argue that the "reasonable basis" test is a
low threshold to meet. First, though, the Prosecutor would have to notify
the state involved under RS Article 18(1).303 If the state decided to
investigate the case itself, it could trigger the complementarity process
by notifying the Court under RS Article 18(2), after which the Prosecutor
would have to defer to the state.3 °4 However, the Prosecutor could
review his or her deferral to the state under RS Article 18(3) "at any time
when there has been a significant change of circumstances based on the
state's unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the
investigation. 3 °5 As discussed earlier, if two out of three members of
the Pre-Trial Chamber rule in favor of the Prosecutor, he or she would be
able to proceed.
In addition, if a state did elect to conduct an administrative
investigation, and that state determined there was no criminal intent
under RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv), a Prosecutor that wished to politicize the
302 Rome Statute, supra note 3.
303 Id.
304 Id. art. 18(2).
305 Id. art. 18(3).
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process could test how the Court would rule on RS Article 17(1)(b). RS
Article 17(l)(b) makes a case inadmissible if: "The case has been
investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute.3°6 On its face, this provision would seem to enable a state to
investigate and decide not to prosecute, but the Prosecutor could
nonetheless try to make the case that the State is unwilling to genuinely
prosecute.
Although many NGOs may wish to see the ICC Prosecutor fully
execute this course of action, it is a path fraught with risk for the ICC
Prosecutor.3°7 The ICC is a new international organization trying to
establish its credibility and legitimacy; it is hindered by the lack of a
police force and an incarceration mechanism. 308 The ICC also has no
306 Id. art. 17(1)(b).
307 CHRISTOPHER KEITH HALL, SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT PROSECUTORIAL POLICY AND STRATEGY AND EXTERNAL
RELATIONS 12 (2003), at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/hall.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005) ("The Prosecutor will face enormous pressures from the
general public, the press, some national non-governmental organizations and
some victims to investigate and prosecute every crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court and many that are not within the jurisdiction of the Court.").
308 Mary Margaret Penrose, No Badges, No Bars: A Conspicuous Oversight in
the Development of an International Criminal Court, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 621,
625 (2003).
The ICC, as currently structured, has no police force to assist
it with finding, arresting, and securing potential suspects.
Rather, the Rome Statute preserves, with limited exception,
the deficient approach currently utilized by both the ICTY and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),
whereby arrests are made by 'cooperating states' or NATO
forces. A second major deficiency in the ICC's current
formulation is the lack of any international or regional system
for incarceration purposes. The Rome Statute clearly
indicates, and indeed limits, the possible penalties of
conviction to terms of imprisonment. Yet, oddly enough, the
Rome Statute does not provide for a permanent facility where
ICC convicts will be housed. Instead, the Rome Statute
maintains the status quo used unsuccessfully by both the ICTY
and ICTR, which relies upon "willing states" to provide prison
facilities on an 'as needed' or "as desired" basis.
Id. at 625-26 (citations omitted).
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ability to "seize evidentiary material, execute arrests, make searches or
compel witnesses to give testimony without the co-operation of national
authorities. "30 9 As a result, the ICC Prosecutor must take into account
how likely it is that a state will cooperate with his investigation against
310that state's citizens.
In this regard, it is highly likely that the U.S. will strongly
oppose any efforts by the ICC Prosecutor to investigate or prosecute U.S.
military or civilian personnel. In the Belgian cases, the U.S. made it
clear through official channels that it strongly protested Belgian
jurisdiction. The U.S. also used its available leverage (suspending
NATO headquarters funding and questioning the continued viability of
Belgium as a host for NATO) in a successful effort to convince Belgium
to change the Act. Indeed, John Bolton, the U.S. Under Secretary for
Arms Control and International Security, specifically cites the Belgian
cases as a basis for believing "our concerns about politically motivated
prosecutions against U.S. personnel are not just hypothetical. 3
309 Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion Within the International
Criminal Court, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 71, 88 (2004).
310 Id. ("The overall effectiveness of the Prosecutor depends on his ability to
compel states to co-operate and comply with his decisions .... Due to these
limitations, the Prosecutor, as the principle organ of investigation, will need to
consider the likelihood of state co-operation when deciding whether to initiate
an investigation.").
311 John R. Bolton, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Washington,
DC (Nov. 3, 2003), at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/25818.htm (last visited Mar.
1, 2005). Under Secretary Bolton stated:
Our concerns about politically motivated charges against U.S.
persons are not just hypothetical. Recently in Belgium,
allegations of war crimes were brought against the President,
the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and
former President Bush under that country's notorious and far-
reaching universal competence statute. That problem was
brought closer to home when senior Belgian officials
themselves were charged under the statute, and the law was
subsequently amended to limit its scope. Without sufficient
protection against such frivolous charges, responsible officials
may be deterred from carrying out a wide range of legitimate
functions across the spectrum, from actions integral to our
national defense to peacekeeping missions or interventions in
humanitarian crises or civil wars....
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Moreover, the U.S. government has already taken every
available step to protect its personnel from ICC jurisdiction. In doing so,
the U.S. has relied upon provisions of the Rome Statute as well as
domestic legislation. The U.S. National Security Strategy summarizes
this strategy:
We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our
efforts to meet our global security commitments and
protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for
investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the
International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction
does not extend to Americans and which we do not
accept. We will work together with other nations to
avoid complications in our military operations and
cooperation, through such mechanisms as multilateral
and bilateral agreements that will protect U.S. nationals
from the ICC. We will implement fully the American
Servicemembers Protection Act, whose provisions are
intended to ensure and enhance the protection of U.S.
personnel and officials." 2
Specifically, the U.S. has negotiated a series of bilateral agreements
under Article 98 of the Rome Statute.313 In these agreements, other
nations pledge not to turn over U.S. personnel to the ICC.314  This
312 THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 34,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
This publication is also available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
313 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 98. Within Article 98, which is entitled
"Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender,"
Article 98(2) provides:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which
the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person
of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for
the surrender.
314 See Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, Eritrea Signs Article 98 Agreement
(July 13, 2004), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/34347.htm (last visited
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protects U.S. personnel stationed abroad from potential ICC prosecution
while the U.S. personnel are in countries that have signed Article 98
agreements. The U.S. has been instrumental in obtaining passage of
U.N. Security Council Resolutions that protect U.S. personnel serving in
U.N. "established or authorized" missions from ICC jurisdiction for 12
month periods under the authority of RS Article 16.315 Finally, the
Mar. 1, 2005) (noting that as of July, 2004, 92 nations had signed Article 98
agreements with the U.S.).
315 See, e.g., Colum Lynch, U.N. Extends US. Peacekeepers' Immunity,
WASH. POST, June 13, 2003, available at WL 56497382.
Confronted with the threat to shut down U.N. peacekeeping
missions, the Security Council agreed unanimously last July to
adopt a resolution that places Americans beyond the reach of
the [ICC], which came into being on July 1, 2002. The
resolution bars states from investigating and prosecuting
individuals from governments that have not ratified the Rome
Statute establishing the court.
Id. But see Jonathan Wald & Liz Neisloss, U.S. Ends War Crimes Exemption
Bid, CNN.Com, June 24, 2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/24/us.war.crimes.court/index.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005) (reporting that United States efforts to renew U.N. Security
Council Resolution were unsuccessful). See also United Nations Peacekeeping,
S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. SCOR, 4772nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (June 12,
2003), available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/394/5 1/PDF/N0339451 .pdf?. OpenElement
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005). The 2003 Security Council resolution states, in
pertinent part:
[The Security Council] Requests, consistent with the
provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statue, that the ICC, if a
case arises involving current or former officials or personnel
from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over
acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or
authorized operation, shall for a 12-month period starting 1
July 2003 not commence or proceed with investigation or
prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council
decides otherwise ....
See also Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 16. Article 16, entitled "Deferral of
investigation or prosecution," provides:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months
after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has
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American Servicemembers Protection Act of 2002, inter alia, prohibits
cooperation with the ICC, prohibits U.S. military assistance to state
parties of the ICC under certain circumstances, and provides the
President authority to "use all means necessary and appropriate to bring
about the release" of any U.S. persons "detained or imprisoned, by or on
behalf of," the ICC. 316 Given all of these protective measures, there can
be no doubt that the U.S. will take whatever actions it must to thwart an
ICC Prosecutor investigation over alleged U.S. violations of RS Article
8(2)(b)(iv).
But if the ICC Prosecutor pursues such an investigation, his
chances of success are negligible given the foreseeable lack of
cooperation by the U.S. and the absence of any real enforcement powers
by the ICC. One commentator viewed this scenario as leading to the
ICC's "political destruction. 31 7 Another commentator has warned of the
requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed
by the Council under the same conditions.
316 American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, §§
2004, 2007-08, 116 Stat. 899, 902-03, 905-06 (2002) (codified as 22 U.S.C.A.
§§ 7423, 7426-7427 (2002)), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 107_congpubliclaws&docid=f:publ2O6.107.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
317 Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics. The Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 1633, 1655 (2003). Professor Danner writes:
If the ICC prosecutor chooses to pursue a vendetta
against the United States, there is no doubt he will have the
opportunity to do so under the letter - if not the spirit - of the
Rome Statute, given the extent of U.S. military actions abroad.
Unless he has plausible charges to bring, however, the
prosecutor will be unable to make significant progress in his
investigation and will likely precipitate the political
destruction of the court. At present, the court gets its strength
from its claim of providing an impartial forum for
international prosecutions. If the court appears blatantly
partial, then it loses its only real source of power: its moral
authority. The United States would undoubtedly win any
battle it wages against a zealous prosecutor fired by anti-
American sentiment, but the appearance of such a figure
would likely spell disaster for the ICC.
Id. at 1655.
VOL. 13
THE ICC PROSECUTOR
ICC committing "a form of suicide" if the Prosecutor pursues an overly
political investigation "in disregard of state interests."
31 8
On the other hand, the Prosecutor could avoid this potentially
catastrophic outcome by taking a different path. The Prosecutor could
decide that cases based entirely on charges of incidental collateral
damage should not generally be prosecuted in the ICC. If made by the
Prosecutor, this decision would track the ICTY Prosecutor's conclusion
in the Kosovo case. However, in such an instance, the ICC Prosecutor
should learn from the ICTY Prosecutor's mistakes, and not publicly
disclose any internal reports that address in meticulous detail why
specific allegations did not warrant prosecution. Recall the remarks
quoted above from Ms. Judith Miller, the U.S. Department of Defense
General Counsel, on the impact of the ICTY report. While the ICTY
Prosecutor's conclusion and statements were not critical in any way of
U.S. and NATO forces, the ICTY Prosecutor committee's report delved
into operational details in such a dissecting manner that the report was
critical, at least implicitly, of NATO targeting decisions, NATO rules of
engagement, and the conduct of NATO pilots in combat. Furthermore,
when the ICTY Prosecutor publicly released the investigation report, it
conveyed the notion that there was something wrong or improper with
the conduct of U.S/NATO forces and also created the impression that
there was a "moral equivalence" between U.S./NATO forces and those
of Slobadan Milogevi. When you have forces that are abiding by the
law of war in good faith, unintended incidental injuries or damage are
simply not the moral equivalent of more egregious war crimes and
should not be treated as such.319
318 Brubacher, supra note 309.
On the other hand, were the Prosecutor to exercise his ability
to launch investigations in disregard of state interests, the
Prosecutor will expose the Court to the danger of being
marginalized in the international system, setting a damaging
precedent for future attempts to enforce humanitarian norms.
To ignore the political realities would subject the
Court to a form of suicide in so far as it would become
marginalized in its relations with states and, ultimately, in its
ability to enforce international justice.
Id. at 93-94 (citations omitted).
319 See Anderson, supra note 169, who writes:
Legal culpability cannot be determined simply by looking at
the level of damage and the death and injury caused. There is
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Instead, the ICC Prosecutor could simply quietly dismiss or not
act upon communications from NGOs dealing with collateral damage
claims. However, this would simply be postponing the issue. It also
would encourage NGOs to continue to bring these claims following any
U.S. military action. An attorney for HRW discussed the implications of
RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) from an NGO perspective:
[E]ven if the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court leaves this crime untouched for a while to avoid
deepening the hostility of the United States towards the
court, its simple existence on the books will impel
governments to analyze standards more carefully and
will encourage nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
to take on its analysis.
320
Consequently, to avoid having the volatile issue of collateral
damage investigations looming indefinitely, the ICC Prosecutor should
promulgate a policy statement indicating that he normally will not
investigate allegations of collateral damage. 21 The statement could be
no moral equivalence between stray missiles aimed in good
faith, using the best technology available, and deliberate
violation of the categorical rules of war, like using human
shields, shelling civilians to prevent them from fleeing Basra
and rape or summary execution of prisoners. There can be no
element of judgment, or weighing of costs and benefits, in
deciding whether or not to target civilians or take them
hostage; it is always wrong.
Id.
320 PoKempner, supra note 174.321 Other commentators have already proposed, in more general terms, setting
guidelines for the ICC Prosecutor. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner,
Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the
International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 541-50 (2003). She
believes the ICC Prosecutor should
adopt prosecutorial guidelines. The guidelines should provide
information about the factors that the Prosecutor will consider,
and those he will not consider, when making his discretionary
decisions, particularly with regard to investigating, screening,
charging, and admissibility decisions, where his discretion is
at its apogee. The guidelines should also include explanatory
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as simple as this: "The ICC Prosecutor will not normally investigate
allegations under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) if the armed forces involved made a
sincere and good faith effort to comply with the laws of war during the
conflict from which the complaint arose." In implementing this policy,
the Prosecutor should insist that NGOs articulate precisely why they
believe a specific case of collateral damage amounts to a violation of
Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
Patricia Wald, a judge on the ICTY from 1999-2001 and a self-
acknowledged ICC supporter, recently endorsed this proposal in theory
and addressed the rationale behind it. She noted the concern that the ICC
Prosecutor may target senior U.S. civilian and military leaders for
"crimes based upon their strategic wartime decisions" and the critique of
the ICC that:
leaders on the front line who must make on-the-spot
decisions as to what is a military or civilian target or
whether an assault on a particular target will cause
extreme collateral damage, disproportionate to its
military benefits so as to bring it within the definition of
a war crime, should not have their judgments second-
comments, which will further delineate how the Prosecutor
will consider the enumerated factors.
Id. See also MCDONALD & HAVEMAN, supra note 56, at 3.
Considering that the work of the Court, and the work of
the Prosecutor in particular, will be the subject of extensive
public scrutiny, and that perceptions of the Prosecutor's work
and how his mandate is executed are as important as facts,
particularly in the early phase of the Court's work, the need
for 'objectifying' or pinning down the largely subjective
criteria articulated in Article 53(1) seems obvious.
To avoid fuelling any already existing perceptions of
the ICC as a political court, to minimize [sic] any accusations
of bias, and to increase transparency and boost the credibility
of the Court as a strictly judicial institution, it is necessary to
identify the guiding principles underpinning the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and to identifying criteria which can
be applied in each instance in order to determine whether the
conditions of Article 53(1) have been fulfilled.
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guessed by hostile judges at the risk of incurring long
terms of imprisonment.3"'
She suggested addressing this concern through a:
special process for dealing with charges based on
strategic military judgment calls. The Prosecutor might
issue a policy statement, setting out the circumstances
under which this kind of case would be brought. Such
transparency might ward off unreasonable or even
sincere fears of prosecutions motivated by political
revenge or national envy. He might even consider
publicly stating his rationale for refusing to investigate
these kinds of allegations in a few high-profile cases.323
This proposal to generally refrain from prosecuting collateral
damage claims and to articulate this through a policy statement can be
justified on several grounds. First, it greatly reduces the possibility of
the ICC being turned into a political platform for NGO protests against
U.S. policies and actions. Because Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is an offense that
can easily be alleged, it lends itself to politicized allegations. The
Belgian cases clearly demonstrated how some NGOs have no qualms
about making formal war crimes allegations as a means to promote their
own efforts in protesting the war itself. As discussed above, already the
ICC Prosecutor has received numerous complaints over matter it has no
jurisdiction over, including many "protest letters. 324  Numerous
complaints have been filed with the ICC about U.S. actions in Iraq, even
though neither Iraq nor the U.S. is a party to the ICC.3 25 The ICC could
322 Patricia M. Wald, Judge, Is the United States' Opposition to the ICC
Intractable?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 19, 23-24 (2004).
323 Id. at 24.
324 Since July 2002, of the 499 communications received by the ICC
Prosecutor, 424 are protests. See Press Release, The Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, Prosecutor Will Comment on
Communications Received (July 15, 2003), at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/press/mediaalert/pids008_2003-enl.doc (last visited Mar.
1, 2005). See also Court Rejects Anti-U.S. Petitions, supra note 301.
325 Press Release, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Communications Received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC (July 16,
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gain some institutional credibility by distancing itself from many of these
NGO claims. 326  Advocates for NGOs may view this proposal as a
capitulation to the U.S., but such a proposal merely asserts the ICC
Prosecutor's intent regarding one offense out of the litany of war crimes
in the Prosecutor's arsenal. Indeed, there may even be support for this
proposal in some NGO quarters, as such a proposal could help assuage
the U.S. government's opposition to the ICC and provide the ICC the
room it needs to develop.327 Along these lines, Christopher Keith Hall,
the Head of the International Justice Programme, Amnesty International
urges the ICC Prosecutor emphasize his "prosecutor's strategy" in a
manner comparable to the proposal suggested above.328
2003), at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/press/mediaalert/16july_english.pdf
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
326 Danner, supra note 321, at 534.
In the case of the ICC, NGOs will likely push the
Prosecutor to act aggressively, even-or especially, perhaps-
in politically sensitive cases.... The danger is that NGOs will
try to force the Prosecutor's hand in cases where he considers
it imprudent to venture, at least at that time. Sophisticated
NGOs can no doubt perceive the danger of overreaching by
the ICC and might choose not to push such politically
explosive cases. Given the number of NGOs, however, and
the diversity of viewpoints within the NGO community,
NGOs are unlikely to be completely self-restraining. As
Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch has observed,
"[T]here is no one controlling the on/off switch to the Office
of the Prosecutor."
It would be naive, however, to discount the danger of
excessive NGO involvement or influence on prosecutorial
decision making. Critics of the ICC routinely charge that the
Prosecutor will be dominated by NGOs. Just as the Prosecutor
must firmly maintain his independence from states, he must
also distance himself from NGOs.
Id. (citations omitted).
327 Brubacher, supra note 309, at 93 ("As stated by Amnesty International, an
ineffectual ICC is worse than having no ICC at all.").
328 See Hall, supra note 307, at 41.
For example, instead of saying, as some defenders of the
Court now do, that no US national will ever come before the
Court, it would be better to emphasize the Prosecutor's
prosecution strategy, so that the general public will quickly
draw its own conclusions that unless the USA plans to commit
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Second, the ICC Prosecutor would be justified in making a
policy statement to generally refrain from prosecuting collateral damage
crimes under RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) on the grounds that such offenses are
extremely difficult to prove. Given the high levels of knowledge and
intent required by RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv), coupled with the additional
requirement that the loss must be "clearly excessive" in relation to the
military gain, the ICC Prosecutor will find it exceedingly difficult to
prosecute this crime successfully. Recall that, as discussed earlier, the
grave breach version that the Rome Statute adopts is practically
comparable to proving a direct attack on civilians or civilian objects. By
following a policy of generally not pursuing this charge, the Prosecutor
can reduce the potential need for the Court to engage in difficult and
subjective proportionality balancing test determinations. Thus, by not
venturing into this thicket, the Court preserves its legitimacy. In
contrast, if forced to address these questions, the court essentially puts
itself in a situation where it could be compelled to second-guess military
targeting decisions approved at the highest level of a state.
The difficulty of collateral damage cases for prosecutors and
judges is compounded by the dearth of case law in this area.
Historically, war crimes tribunals have not prosecuted charges based on
allegations of excessive collateral damage.329 Indeed, W.J. Fenrick, the
Senior Legal Adviser, ICTY- Office of The Prosecutor, stated, "No
tribunal to date has ever explicitly determined in a well articulated
manner in a close case that disproportionate damage was caused during
an attack on a military objective."'33 While the ICTY has prosecuted
five cases of unlawful attack, an offense that is based on AP I Article 51
and is similar to RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv), the ICTY charge has a lower
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes on a
considerable scale, US nationals are likely to be investigated
and prosecuted for such crimes only in national courts.
Id.
329 W.J. FENRICK, CRIMES IN COMBAT: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES (2004), at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/Fenrick.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) ("[T]he ICC
may, of course, simply adopt the approach taken by most tribunals in the past,
including those which adjudicated the post World War II war crimes cases, and
ignore offences committed in combat.").
330 Id. at 8. See also Wald, supra note 322, at 24 ("[I]t does not appear that any
high-ranking military or civic leaders have been brought to trial before any of
the existing international courts on borderline judgment calls.").
VOL. 13
THE ICC PROSECUTOR
threshold of proof.33 ' Additionally, the ICTY cases are not entirely
apposite to the typical case of unintended collateral damage. The ICTY
cases involved allegations such as massacres of civilians in a small town
and deliberate sniper attacks on civilians in Sarajevo.332 For example, in
the Galic case, the unlawful attack charge was dismissed as it was
cumulative with the charge of terror that General Galic was found guilty
of, i.e., for the murder of hundreds of civilians who were targeted in
broad daylight under conditions where it was clear they were not
engaging in any military activities.333 Therefore, the ICTY jurisprudence
331 FENRICK, supra note 329, at 9-10.
In your cases before the ICC, of course, the analogous
offences to out unlawful attack offences would (include).. .Art
8(2)(b)(iv) .... These offences and their related elements are
not precisely the same as ours. In particular: (a) the mental
element differs - ours, derived from the APs is "wilful", yours
is "intentional", . . .(c) your proportionality standard "clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated" appears to be higher than ours which
omits the underlined words ....
Id.
332 Id. at 4-5.
The ICTY-OTP has prosecuted unlawful attack charges in five
cases to date. Trial judgments have been rendered in Balskie,
Kordi6/Cerkez, and Gali. Trials are currently underway in
Strugar and in Milogevi5. Balski6 and Kordi/Cerkez were
trials involving Bosnian-Croat accused and incidents in the
Lasva River Valley in Bosnia, in particular the Ahmici
massacre in which many of the inhabitants of a small Bosnian
village were killed when it was overrun by Bosnian-Croat
forces. Gali6 was the commander of Bosnian-Serb forces
involved in a protracted shelling and sniping campaign against
the inhabitants of Sarajevo. Strugar was the commander of
Yugoslav National Army Forces engaged in what the
prosecution alleges was the unlawful shelling of the Old Town
of Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991. Milosevid is charged with
a wide responsibility for a wide range of offences including
offences related to what happened in Sarajevo and in
Dubrovnik.
Id. The actual opinions may be found at
http://www.un.org/icty/cases/jugemindex-e.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
333 See FENRICK, supra note 329, at 4-5 (expressing the opinion that the Galid
case is "by far the most elaborate and thoughtful judicial decision ever rendered
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in connection with unlawful attacks."). But see Tejal Jesrani, Updates from the
International Criminal Courts, 11 HuM. RTS. BR. 61 (2004). Jesrani reviews
the Galid case in a manner that makes clear how egregious Galic's criminal
misconduct was:
During the period covered in the indictment, General
Galic was a commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
(SRK), a branch of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS),
which was embroiled in armed conflict with the Army of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH). The Prosecution alleged that
Galic was criminally responsible for a campaign of sniping
and shelling attacks on civilians in the parts of Sarajevo
controlled by ABiH with the primary purpose of inflicting
terror. The Prosecution claimed that this campaign resulted in
a large number of deaths and injuries to civilians. The Defense
contested the allegations, claiming that the civilian casualties
were collateral to legitimate military activity and resulted from
the targeting errors and stray bullets of both warring factions.
The Trial Chamber heard the testimony of 171
witnesses and viewed a large number of visual exhibits. The
group of witnesses included victims of the attacks,
international military personnel stationed in Sarajevo, and
members of the armed forces of both parties to the conflict.
The majority found that civilians in Sarajevo were attacked
generally during the day and that the attacks were not in
response to any military threat. In addition, the majority
determined that the attackers could easily tell that their victims
were engaged in everyday civilian activities. These findings
fulfilled the requirements for the chapeau elements of
violations of the laws of war. In addition, the majority found
that hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands were
injured in these attacks in the two-year period covered in the
indictment. Although Judge Nieto-Navia authored a lone
dissent, the majority found that the attacks were part of a
widespread and systematic campaign against civilians,
fulfilling the chapeau requirements for crimes against
humanity. In essence, the majority found that the SRK forces
were guilty of each of the crimes alleged in the indictment and
stated that it only had to rule on General Galic's responsibility
in those crimes.
The majority found General Galic guilty of the crime
of terror and dismissed the charges of attacks of civilians as
violations of the laws of war. Both of these crimes are
prohibited by Article 51 of Additional Protocol I to the
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does not add a great deal to the paucity of case law on collateral damage
war crimes prosecution and thus, will not assist the ICC Prosecutor in
resolving less egregious cases.
A third rationale for the ICC policy statement proposed above is
that such a policy would keep with the Rome Statute's spirit. The "in
particular" threshold of RS Article 8 would be most appropriate in this
setting. When a state makes a good faith and conscientious effort to
comply with the laws of war, but unintended collateral damage results
nonetheless, clearly there is not a state organized "plan or policy" to
commit war crimes, nor is there "a large scale commission" of war
crimes. As a result, an ICC Prosecutor should be mindful of the "in
particular" language in RS Article 8 and exercise his or her discretion not
to prosecute. Likewise, a policy statement clarifying the Prosecutors
intent not to prosecute these types of crimes would add meaning to the
"gravity" requirements in RS Article 17 and RS Article 53.
On the other hand, an argument against such a policy statement
by the ICC prosecutor may be that it would eliminate the ICC's influence
to potentially deter collateral damage. However, recent U.S. history has
shown that civilian casualties often cause a decrease in public support for
the particular operation.334 This, in and of itself, is a strong incentive to
minimize civilian casualties. Additionally, the Kosovo and Iraq
operations revealed a strong commitment to minimizing civilian
casualties as well. Given these factors, any deterrent effect the ICC has
on reducing unintended collateral damage is remote and speculative at
best.
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and were read into the ICTY
Statute under the expansive capability of Article 3. The
majority noted that this was the first time it had to pronounce
on the material and mental elements of the crime of terror. The
crime of terror has the same legal elements as the crime of
attack on civilians, plus an additional mental element requiring
that the main purpose of the act be to spread terror among the
civilian population. Since the law on cumulative convictions
prohibits multiple convictions under different articles of the
statute for the same facts, and favors a conviction under the
more specific provision, the majority dismissed the charges of
attacks on civilian populations and upheld the conviction of
terror as a violation of the laws of war.
334 IGNATIEFF, supra note 187, at 192-93 (citing the negative effect on public
support for U.S. operations following civilian casualties in Iraq and Serbia).
Fall 2005
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
Fourth, the ICC Prosecutor would be justified to adopt a policy
of generally not pursuing collateral damage cases because such a policy
could help to slowly build a comfort level with the ICC in the U.S. Most
of the arguments against the ICC are ultimately premised on the
possibility that the Prosecutor may pursue politically motivated
investigations against the U.S., particularly against high-level military
and civilian officials. Indeed, Undersecretary Bolton has stressed this
theme:
Our concern goes beyond the possibility that the
Prosecutor will target for indictment the isolated U.S.
soldier who violates our own laws and values by
allegedly committing a war crime. Our principal concern
is for our country's top civilian and military leaders,
those responsible for our defense and foreign policy.
They are the ones potentially at risk at the hands of the
ICC's politically unaccountable Prosecutor, as part of an
agenda to restrain American discretion, even when our
actions are legitimated by the operation of our own
constitutional system.33
Because collateral damage incidents are bound to arise in any significant
military operation, the U.S. concern about politicized prosecutions or
investigations at the ICC is a valid one. If the ICC Prosecutor focuses on
major human rights atrocities, though, the ICC may gradually dispel
some of the major U.S. concerns with the Court. If it becomes clear that
the ICC does not intend to investigate and review each and every U.S.
operational decision that results in unintended civilian casualties, then
attitudes towards the ICC may change over time.
Thus, another part of increasing the U.S. comfort level with the
ICC may require the Prosecutor to recognize the difference between
prosecuting military personnel for incidents of unintentional collateral
damage and prosecuting military personnel for intentional criminal
conduct conducted in contrast to a state's military policy. Although the
U.S. concern with the ICC is based on the need to protect U.S. service
members abroad from politicized prosecutions, the U.S. appears to have
335 John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,
Remarks to the Federalist Society (Nov. 14, 2002), at
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2005). See also
Scheffer, supra note 69.
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the greater fear that the court will undermine senior U.S. military and
civilian officials.336 This is because it would be very difficult for the ICC
Prosecutor to assert, in good faith under RS Article 17, that the U.S. has
not acted "independently or impartially" following the prosecution of a
U.S. service member for intentional criminal acts of misconduct during a
military operation and the ICC Prosecutor would thus be bound to defer
to the U.S. prosecution.337 A concrete example of this in the context of
our case studies is how many of the perpetrators of detainee abuse at the
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq have been or will be prosecuted by the U.S.
military under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.3 38 Similarly, in the
336 See Sadat & Carden, supra note 5, at 593.
337 id.
The current government continues to emphasize the need to
protect U.S. soldiers stationed or sent abroad from frivolous or
politically motivated prosecutions in the ICC. Pursuant to the
principle of complementarity, however, there is very little
actual likelihood of such an occurrence because the United
States already conducts investigations in cases where serious
and credible allegations of war crimes have been made ....
Perhaps, then, the real issue is not U.S. soldiers, but the
Court's potential effect on senior civilian and military leaders
whose overall policies could theoretically be subject to
judicial review if war crimes allegations ensue.
Id. (citations omitted).
338 Jim Garamone, Rumsfeld Pledges to Take All Actions Needed at Abu Ghraib,
American Forces Press Service, May 4, 2004, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/nO5042004_200405045.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2005). In a stark comparison to his remarks about the Belgian
cases, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke strongly about the imperative need to take
disciplinary action against the soldiers who abused Iraqi detainees at the Abu
Ghraib prison:
The Defense Department will take all actions
necessary to find out what happened at Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq and see that the appropriate actions are taken, the
department's top civilian leader said today.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said the
matter of alleged abuse of prisoners in the prison by U.S.
military personnel will be pursued properly under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. "The actions of the soldiers in those
photographs are totally unacceptable and un-American,"
Rumsfeld said during a Pentagon news conference. Any who
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peace keeping operations in Kosovo following OAF, Staff Sergeant
Frank Rhongi was prosecuted by the U.S. military for brutally sexually
assaulting and murdering an eleven year old local girl and received a
engaged in such actions let down their comrades who serve
honorably each day, and they let down their country."
Rumsfeld said the actions of the prison guards at the
facility were an exception, and the vast majority of service
members serve the United States with honor. "They uphold
the values of our country as they battle enemies that show
little compassion or respect for innocent human life," he said.
The photographs taken by participants and now
broadcast around the world show American service members
abusing and degrading Iraqi detainees. Rumsfeld said the
actions of those few American service members "damaged"
the fragile trust the United States is trying to build with the
people of Iraq.
"The images that we have seen that include U.S.
forces are deeply disturbing-both because of the fundamental
unacceptability of what they depicted, and because the actions
of U.S. military personnel in those photos do not in any way
represent the values of our country or the armed forces"
Rumsfeld said.
Rumsfeld stressed that the U.S. military took
immediate action upon receiving the accusations. A soldier in
the unit was disturbed by what he had witnessed and reported
it through the chain of command Jan. 13. On Jan. 14, special
agents with the Army Criminal Investigation Command were
on the case.
Id. See also Jim Garamone, Military Accuses Six of Abusing Detainees in Iraq,
American Forces Press Service, Mar. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2004/n03202004_200403203 .html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2005); American Forces Press Service, Soldier Sentenced to
One-Year Confinement, May 20, 2004, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/n05202004_200405201 .html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2005) ("As part of a pre-trial agreement, Sivits pleaded guilty to
one count of conspiracy to maltreat detainees, two counts of maltreatment of
detainees and one count of dereliction of duty, according to Central Command
officials."); THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE,
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL IV (2002), available at
http:www.jag.navy.mildocuments/mcm2000.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
The Punitive Articles of the UCMJ contain many criminal charges that can
cover the same type of criminal misconduct covered by Rome Statute offenses.
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dishonorable discharge and confinement to life without parole.33 9 In
these situations, the individuals involved committed crimes that did not
in any way represent U.S. government policy, while they could be
considered war crimes under the Rome Statute. Conversely, allegations
of war crimes for unintentional collateral damage resulting from the act
of planning or executing a military mission do, in fact, directly impinge
on U.S. foreign policy interests. Therefore, by essentially setting these
types of politicized allegations to the side through the use of the
proposed prosecutorial guidelines, the ICC Prosecutor can signal to the
U.S. that their greatest concerns with the ICC are unwarranted.
"9 U.S. v. Rhongi, 60 M.J. 83 (C.A.A.F).
Appellant was deployed with the 82d Airborne
Division in Kosovo on January 13, 2000, when he committed
the crimes that resulted in his sentence to LWOP. As aptly
described by the government, Appellant 'took advantage of
the trust, respect, and kindness' that eleven-year-old Merita
Shabiu showed to American soldiers. "Appellant led her to a
dark and deserted, filthy, trash-strewn basement where he
indecently assaulted, forcibly anally sodomized, and murdered
with premeditation, this innocent child victim."
As a result of these brutal acts, Appellant pled guilty
to and was found guilty of premeditated murder, indecent acts
with a child under 16 years of age, and forcible sodomy of a
child under 16 years of age, in violation of Articles 118, 134,
and 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 10
U.S.C. §§ 918, 934, 925 (2000). Appellant agreed to plead
guilty under a pretrial agreement that provided for a non-
capital referral.
Id. at 84. While Rhongi's criminal acts took place before the ICC became
operational, the case is an example of the U.S. military prosecuting an individual
deployed outside of the United States during a military operation.
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VII. Conclusion
While political considerations will be inescapable, the
choices that are made in the early stages, and the reasons
behind those choices, will set the tone for years to come
and will strongly influence public perceptions of the
Court and what it is for. It is therefore of critical
importance that the OTP gives long and hard thought to
the issue of prosecutorial discretion and how it should be
exercised.34 °
While one can analyze the powers of the ICC Prosecutor by
reviewing the Rome Statute and the Rome Conference organization, the
actual practice of the Prosecutor and the Court will ultimately shape the
contours of the Rome Statute and determine the meaning of many of its
provisions. Many of the checks on the Prosecutor's powers are of a
precatory nature; they provide guidance that the Prosecutor is free to
disregard if he or she chooses to do so. Thus, much will depend on the
actions of the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor has a unique opportunity,
through his or her actions, to shape international opinion of the ICC. By
aggressively pursuing U.S. military operations that involve unintended
collateral damage, the Prosecutor will play into the hands of the ICC's
strongest critics. The Prosecutor will confirm their suspicions that the
Prosecutor will seek to "criminalize good faith debates in military
doctrine" and become "a self propelled auditor of American military
operations. ' '341
3 40 MCDONALD & HAVEMAN, supra note 56.
341 Ruth Wedgwood, The United States and the International Criminal Court,
The Irresolution of Rome, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193, 194, 198 (2001).
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On the other hand, if the Prosecutor concentrates specifically on
the "most serious crimes of international concern," and performs in an
objective, non-partisan manner, the Prosecutor's performance may
provide the strongest rebuttal to ICC critics. 342 How the Prosecutor
handles the first allegation of collateral damage will go a long way in
revealing which path the Prosecutor will follow.
342 Wald, supra note 322, at 22. ("Many ICC supporters in the United States-
myself included-believe that the most formidable weapon against ICC critics
will be the track record of the Court itself in its first several years.").
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